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CLASSIC FAIR USE OF TRADEMARKS:
CONFUSION ABOUT DEFENSES
David W. Barnest and Teresa A. Laky*
ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in K.P.
Permanent, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions, Inc. recognizing an
undeniable split in the federal Courts of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit
held that the classic fair use defense to trademark infringement was
available only if there was an absence of confusion resulting from an
alleged infringer's descriptive use of a term registered by another as a
mark. By contrast, the Second Circuit has held that the fair use
defense may permit a person to use another mark despite evidence of
confusion. Other circuits have taken intermediate positions.
Commentators question whether fair use is truly a defense at all, or
just a way to rebut the mark owner's evidence of consumer confusion.
This article argues that the goals of trademark law are best
served by recognizing that a fair use defense is applicable, even if
some confusion is likely. Mark owners' interest in the goodwill
associated with their marks, consumers' interests in both freedom
from confusion and information about market alternatives, and
society's interest in a competitive market require a balancing test for
fair use. This article emphasizes the weight to be given to the
competitive benefit of access to trademarked terms by analogy to the
policy of denying trademark protection to functional product designs.
Accordingly, confusion is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the fair
use defense.
This article proposes a balancing test allowing reasonable access
to an owner's mark for descriptive purposes. It explains how the
balancing test works by identifying types of evidence useful in
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addressing the balancing test and illustrates its application by
addressing the facts of KP Permanent, which the Supreme Court will
decide in its next term. Other fair use tests in trademark law as well
as copyright law support adoption of this approach.
INTRODUCTION
Federal Courts of Appeals disagree about when a person should
be permitted to use another's trademark. One view is that the right to
use a term descriptively is dependent on that user's proof that no
confusion is likely to result.' The contrasting view is that the rights
are independent; descriptive use of another's trademark is permitted
even if some confusion results. On January 9, 2004, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in K.P. Permanent Make- Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression Inc. ("K.P. Permanent If'),2 which squarely
presents the conflict between the federal Courts of Appeals. This
article argues that no federal circuit approaches classic fair use cases
correctly. We propose a balancing test that recognizes conflicting
policy considerations and mediates between the concerns of the
circuits.
Most of the elements in a case involving a classic fair use
defense are undisputed. It is not disputed that the relevant elements
of a mark owner's infringement claim are its prior right to the mark
and the likelihood of confusion arising from the alleged infringer's
use. Further, it is undisputed that two of the elements of an alleged
infringer's fair use defense are: (1) descriptive rather than source-
indicating use of the mark; and (2) fairness or good faith (which we
consider together). We argue that likelihood of confusion is relevant
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 Reporter's Note cmt. b
(1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (observing that the case law reflects substantial
uncertainty regarding the nature of the fair use doctrine: "Many cases apparently view fair use as
relevant only to the likelihood of confusion, thus precluding reliance on the doctrine whenever
confusion is likely [citing cases from the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and federal District
Courts of New York (Southern District), Pennsylvania (Western District), and New Jersey].
Other cases, however, recognize fair use as an independent defense to infringement [citing cases
from the Fifth Circuit and federal District Courts in New York (Southern District), New Jersey,
and Illinois (Northern District)]."). The Restatement, which adopts the view that fair use is an
independent defense notes that leading commentators disagree on whether fair use is properly
considered a rebuttal to the mark owner's prima facie case of infringement or an independent
defense; Id. (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:47, n.42 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MCCARTHY] ("The better view is that it
is inconsistent to find both likely confusion and a fair use.")); SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK
LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 12:2.4[C] (2003) ("So long as defendant's use is descriptive,
in good faith, and not as a trademark, it will be permitted - even if it causes likely confusion.").
2. __ U.S.__, 124 S.Ct. 981 (2004).
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to both elements of the defense, but dispositive of neither. This
approach rejects the Ninth Circuit's requirement that the defendant
gets no benefit from the classic fair use defense if there is any
likelihood of confusion.3 The balancing approach also rejects the
opposing view that a finding of confusion is independent of the right
to use descriptive terms, and the mark holder takes the risk of
confusion by adopting a descriptive mark.4
Part I of this article identifies policy objectives that inform a
sensible understanding of the classic fair use defense. If trademark
law's only goals were avoiding consumer confusion and promoting
competition by protection of the trademark owner's goodwill,
descriptive use should be denied whenever confusion is likely. If
trademark law's goals include enhancing informed choices by
consumers and promoting competition by facilitating entry into
markets, permitting non-mark use of descriptive terms should
sometimes be permitted. The policy analysis sets the foundation for
an appreciation of the split between circuits, and an understanding of
the balancing test and the evidence relevant to it.
In Part II, this article describes the procedural history, facts, and
relevant rulings by the United States District Court for the Central
District of California and Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
K.P. Permanent I, insofar as they relate to the fair use defense, the
strength of the plaintiffs mark, and the incontestable status of that
mark.
In Part III, this article describes the relevant statutory language
and how federal Courts of Appeals analyze classic fair use cases. In
the circuits, likelihood of confusion is either fatal to a fair use defense
or merely plays a supportive role in determining whether an alleged
infringer's use is fair.5 No court considers a balancing test mediating
among the conflicting objectives of trademark law.
We apply our resolution of the classic fair use issue and to the
case before the Supreme Court in Part IV. The classic fair use
defense applies only when the alleged infringer's fair, good faith use
3. K.P. Permanent, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1073 (9th Cir.
2003) [hereinafter K.P. Permanent I] (stating that "the fair use defense claimed by KP is a
classic fair use defense that requires that there not be a likelihood of confusion.").
4. See, e.g., Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir.
1995) (ordering summary judgment for the defendant on a fair use claim and stating "[i]f any
confusion results to the detriment of the markholder, that was a risk entailed in the selection of a
mark with descriptive attributes").
5. Compare K.P. Permanent 1, 328 F.3d at 1073 and cases cited infra notes 43-44.
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of a term is not as a mark, but only as a description. 6 Part IV.A
argues that courts in fair use cases ought to consider the inherent or
acquired distinctiveness of the owner's mark, the likelihood of
confusion resulting from the alleged infringer's use, the commercial
impression created by the alleged infringer's use, and the harm to
competition and consumers from forbidding others' descriptive use of
the term. Preventing confusion plays both an independent role as one
of the objectives of trademark law and a supporting role. Under the
balancing test presented in this section, likelihood of confusion is
only one of several factors relevant to whether the defendant's use is
"as a mark" or "only to describe." But it is also one factor relevant to
the balancing implicit in deciding whether the use is fair. This second
consideration of likelihood of confusion in a fair use analysis
distinguishes our balancing test from the analyses employed by the
various Courts of Appeals. We argue that because descriptive terms
are analogous to functional product designs, they should be
reasonably available and in the public domain, even if some
confusion results.
Part IV.B demonstrates that courts do not explicitly balance the
factors we have identified, but often do consider these factors in
analyzing whether the descriptive use was fair and in good faith.
Because likelihood of confusion is only one consideration in deciding
each element, the fair use defense may apply even though there is
some likelihood of confusion. Because evidence unrelated to
confusion is relevant to fair use, fair use is presented as a defense
rather than simply a rebuttal of the plaintiffs prima facie case of
infringement, as suggested by leading commentators. The fair use
defense requires a balancing of harms and benefits to consumers and
competition not relevant to the plaintiff's primary infringement claim.
In Part IV.C, we support the argument in favor of balancing
harms and benefits in classic fair use cases by analogies to the other
intellectual property defenses. The trademark infringement defenses
of nominative, comparative, and artistic fair use employ balancing
tests, as does the fair use defense in copyright law.
In Part IV.D, the application of the balancing test to the facts of
K.P. Permanent I illustrates how public policy considerations are
applied to a particular case. We recommend that the Supreme Court
remand to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the need to
balance competing policy objectives. The Ninth Circuit may
ultimately remand to the District Court to develop the record more
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
[ ol. 20
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fully. The reasons for remanding to the District Court would be
dramatically different from those stated by the Ninth Circuit in K.P.
Permanent I.
Part V considers whether the balancing approach recommended
in this article is consistent with the goals of the Lanham Act's
incontestability provisions. Our proposal has no effect on the first
purpose identified by the Supreme Court, which is to quiet title by
establishing a conclusive presumption regarding the mark's validity
and the mark owner's right to use the mark. Our suggested balancing
approach furthers the Court's other two goals by promoting
registration and encouraging investment in goodwill.
The balancing test we propose allows reasonable access to an
owner's mark for descriptive purposes. On one side of the scale are
the inherent or acquired distinctiveness and strength of that mark and
the likelihood of confusion created by the other's use. The benefits
associated with descriptive uses of marks are balanced against the
harm to mark owners from loss of distinctiveness and to consumers
from confusion. Descriptive terms provide information about
alternatives, which enables competitors to attract customers and
consumers to purchases goods and services commensurate with their
needs. Moreover, a balancing test for the classic fair use defense is
consistent with the goals of trademark law, since adopting a balancing
test would make the defense of classic fair use consistent with other
fair uses defenses in intellectual property law.
I. PROMOTING COMPETITION THROUGH THE LANHAM ACT:
BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF MARK OWNERS, CONSUMERS, AND
DESCRIPTIVE USERS
Striving to promote the appropriate level of competition, the
Lanham Act addresses conflicting interests. The Lanham Act grants
exclusive trademark rights to "secure to the owner of the mark the
goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers." 7 But the Lanham Act also
restricts exclusive trademark rights when another's use of a mark is
fair. Thus, there is a spectrum of possible trademark protection,
where at one extreme, exclusive use of a trademark is protected
absolutely; at the other extreme, exclusive use of a trademark is given
little protection, and others are also allowed to make certain limited
use of the mark. Trademark law promotes competition both by
7. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
2004]
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protecting mark-owners' goodwill and also by protecting competitors'
right to use another's mark in a descriptive way. It protects
consumers by enabling them to rely on a mark as a source and quality
indicator and also by allowing them to receive information about
alternative goods and services. Each of these goals is described
below. In determining the appropriate level of competition, both sets
of goals should be considered and balanced.
A. The Goodwill and Competition Objective
Exclusive protection of trademark rights benefits producers by
protecting their investment in a mark's goodwill. Protecting goodwill
encourages mark owners to invest in associating the mark with a
reputation and identity by establishing a presence in the market.8 The
value of the mark depends on the mark owner's ability to maintain
consistent product quality, whether high or low, and send trustworthy
signals about its goods to consumers:9 "His mark is his authentic
seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name
for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation,
whose quality no longer lies within his control. '"1
Protecting goodwill also promotes competition. A new entrant
to a market can use their own distinctive marks to establish brand
recognition as well as a reputation for providing goods with reliable
qualities and characteristics. By informing consumers about
alternatives, new entrants use marks and establish goodwill to
compete against existing suppliers to satisfy consumer demands.
B. The Consumer Protection Objective
Ultimately, the benefit of protecting mark owners' goodwill is to
consumers, who may rely on the qualities and characteristics of the
supplier's goods conveyed through the mark and appreciate the
advantages of vigorous competition." This lowers prices and
increases available alternatives to satisfy consumers' diverse tastes.
12
8. See Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 209 (D. Md.
1988) (considering the extent of the mark owner's rights in current and future, related markets).
9. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987) (exploring the benefits and costs of
recognizing trademark rights) [hereinafter Landes and Posner].
10. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
11. Landes and Posner, supra note 9, at 269.
12. The Supreme Court, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213
(2000), construed the Lanham Act as protecting consumer choice stating, with respect to
trademark protection of product design, "Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of
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This reliance reduces consumers' cost of seeking information about
goods, including not just reading labels, advertising, and literature,
but acquiring experience by buying and rejecting unsuitable goods.
Allowing others to use an owner's mark may confuse consumers
about the source, obscuring information about the goods, and raising
search costs:
The purpose for which the trademark law accords merchants the
exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol in their area or
commerce is identification, so that the merchants can establish
goodwill for their goods based on past satisfactory performance,
and the consuming public can rely on a mark as a guarantee that
the goods or services so marked come from the merchant who has
been found to be satisfactory in the past.13
Thus, an action for trademark infringement by a mark owner requires
proof that use by the other is likely to cause confusion as to the source
of the goods. 14
C. The Consumer Choice Objective
Nonexclusive trademark rights in a term may also function to
benefit consumers and competition. Vigorous competition and
consumer choice is promoted by granting competitors the right to use
terms descriptively, even if those terms are reserved by others as
trademarks.
competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily
services by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon
inherent distinctiveness."; See also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 425 (1954) (stating that buyers who have reasonable alternatives to a particular seller's
product are entitled to competition within the industry because "such competition may lead to
lower prices and improved quality").
13. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003).
14. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) ("It is, of course, also
undisputed that liability under § 43(a) requires proof of likelihood of confusion.") (citing to the
Lanham Act); See also, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir.
2000) (stating that, to prevail on a Lanham Act claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) her mark
is protectable, and (2) the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among
customers); Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 209 (D. Md. 1988)
("There are but two inchoative elements that must be establish for entitlement [to sanction in a
trademark infringement action], from which all permutations and guises of the cause of action
are derived: the senior owner of the mark must demonstrate (1) the adoption and use of a mark
and his entitlement to enforce it, and (2) the adoption and use by a junior user of a mark that is
likely to cause confusion that goods or services emanate from the senior owner."). Proof of
these two elements is required for both federal claims in K.P. Permanent H: trademark
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
2004]
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At the same time, efficiency and the public interest require that
every merchant trading in a class of goods be permitted to refer to
the goods by their name, and to make claims about their quality.
Thus, a merchant who sells pencils under the trademark Pencil or
Clear Mark, for example, and seeks to exclude other sellers of
pencils from using those words in their trade, is seeking an
advantage the trademark law does not intend to offer. To grant
such exclusivity would deprive the consuming public of the useful
market information it receives where every seller of pencils is free
to call them pencils. The trademark right does not protect the
exclusive right to an advertising message--only the exclusive right
to an identifier.
15
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Lanham Act embodies
Congress' response to concern for commercial monopolization of
descriptive terms. 6 If the owner's designation comprises terms that
are useful, even traditional, ways to describe a good or its qualities,
competition will be stifled if others are not allowed to use those
terms. The more necessary the descriptive term is to accomplishing
those objectives, the greater the benefit to competition and consumers
from allowing access. By permitting limited third-party rights to use
an owner's mark descriptively, the mark owner's competitors are
better able to inform consumers about alternatives, which in turn
expands the range of consumer choices and reduces prices.
Both the mark owners' interest in exclusive rights and others'
interest in limited access promote competition and aid consumers.
The challenge is to find the appropriate limit on exclusive rights.
Using another's mark may inform consumers or mislead them.
Classic fair use arises when a person uses another's mark, not as an
indicator of the source of the product, which would mislead, but only
to describe the person's product, which would inform. Each classic
fair use case presents a conflict between confusion arising from
misleading consumers about the source of the goods, and enhanced
competition through increased information about alternatives. No
circuit recognizes that consideration of the defense requires a
balancing of pro and anticompetitive effects.
Other fair use defenses in trademark law do recognize the
inherent balancing process. 17 As Part IV explains, for example, the
15. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
16. Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985). See also id. at 214-15
(Justice Stevens dissenting) (stating that there is a well-recognized public interest in prohibiting
the commercial monopolization of descriptive phrases).
17. See infra Part IV.D.
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tests for nominative and comparative fair use balance the user's and
consumers' interest in identification and comparison to the mark
owner's interest in the mark's source identifying power and goodwill.
Artistic fair use explicitly balances the user's and public's interest in
free expression with the consumers' interest in avoiding confusion
about the source of goods. Courts do not recognize the same need for
balancing in classic fair use cases.
II. K.P. PERMANENT1N THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KP. Permanent II involves
a trademark dispute between
competitors in the permanent
makeup industry. 18  Lasting
Impression I, Inc. ("Lasting
Impression") has an
Pincontestable trademark used
since April 1992 in connection
with its line of permanent makeup pigments. The mark consists of
the term "micro colors" set in white, within a black box, as appears in
the margin. 19
K.P. Permanent, Inc. ("KP") has used the term "micro color"
on its flyers since 1990 and on its bottle labels since 1991.20 KP's use
on the bottles consisted of the word in full capitals followed by the
name of the color in the bottle, e.g., "MICROCOLOR: BLACK." In
1999, KP began to use the term in
its marketing brochures .2 1  The
brochures contain a chart
displaying the various colors in
which KP's product is available.
Above the chart is a title or label
containing the term "micro color"
in a stylized format appearing over the word "pigment" beside a
graphic of a vial with pigment spilling from it, as shown here. These
18. Permanent makeup is pigment injected into the skin in a medical or cosmetic
procedure called "micropigmentation" to produce a result similar to tattooing. K.P. Permanent
Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003).
19. Id. at 1073, app. A.
20. Id. at 1065.
21. Id. at 1066.
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design features appeared over the word "chart." Each of the words
appears in a different typeface.
After receiving a cease and desist letter from Lasting Impression
in 2000, KP sought a declaratory judgment asserting that Lasting
Impression's mark was incapable of receiving protection because it
was either generic or merely descriptive.23 In response to Lasting
Impression's counterclaim that KP's use infringed its mark, KP
argued that, even if Lasting Impression had an exclusive right to the
mark, Lasting Impression could not show a likelihood of confusion,
and thus, KP was entitled to fair use of the term.24 Both moved for
summary judgment, which the District Court granted to KP.25 Lasting
Impressions appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 26 which reversed and
remanded, 27 holding that: (1) a classic fair use defense "requires that
there not be a likelihood of confusion;, 28 and (2) "there are genuine
issues of material fact concerning the likelihood of confusion.,
29
Though the two parts of this holding are related, it is with respect to
the first part that the Federal Courts of Appeals are split and that the
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
III. THE CLASSIC FAIR USE DEFENSE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The classic fair use defense is codified in § 33(b)(4) of the
Lanham Act,3 ° which says that it shall be a defense to an allegation of
infringement of an incontestable mark:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark ... of a term or
device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith
only to describe the goods or services of such party...
22. Id. at 1073, app. B. The four-sided (or ten page) brochure on glossy card stock does
not mention the words "micro color" or the word "microcolor" except as a heading for a chart of
pigment colors that, according to K.P. Permanent, "describe[s] exactly what the chart is."
Appellee's Brief at 11, 26, K.P. Permanent, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-56055), available at 2002 WL 32103626 [hereinafter Appellee's Brief]
(describing brochure as four-sided and as having 10 pages or sides).
23. K.P Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1065.
24. Id. at 1066.
25. Id. at 1061.
26. Id. at 1061.
27. Id. at 1073.
28. Id. at 1073.
29. K.P Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1073.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
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This statutory provision mentions neither goodwill nor likelihood of
confusion, and it does not define what uses may be "fair." Courts
agree that this codification of the fair use defense applies to cases
involving infringement of marks that have not become
incontestable.3'
Determining when the fair use defense applies involves
balancing the competing objectives of goodwill and competition,
consumer protection, and consumer choice. The Second and Ninth
Circuits' decisions regarding the fair use defense reflect the weight
each circuit puts on these objectives and represent opposite policy
approaches to classic fair use. The Second Circuit makes likelihood
of confusion irrelevant, 32 while the Ninth Circuit makes likelihood of
confusion determinative.33
The Second Circuit's rule that likelihood of confusion and fair
use3 4 may coexist heavily favors the consumer choice objective. If
likelihood of confusion does not block a defendant's fair use defense,
a mark may be used by a competitor to describe its competing
product, thereby increasing availability of information about
alternatives to consumers. For example, a distributor of abstracts on
news coverage may fairly use the name of the source of the news
article to designate the source from which the abstract was written.3 5
It also lowers entry barriers for other competitors that want to break
into the market but would have been deterred from doing so if they
were not able to use another's mark to describe their product to
consumers. Thus, the Second Circuit's approach enhances consumer
choice and vigorous competition by keeping more descriptive terms
in the public domain.
31. See e.g., M.B.H. Enterprises, Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 52 n.2 (7th Cir.
1980); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 11:49.
32. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28,
30 (2d Cir. 1997).
33. K.PPermanent, 328 F.3d at 1071-73.
34. Cosmetically Sealed Indus., 125 F.3d at 30. The plaintiff marketed its lip gloss with
the registered trademark "sealed with a kiss," and the defendant used the phrase "seal it with a
kiss" as part of its promotional materials to sell its new line of lipsticks. Id. at 29. The Second
Circuit was unsympathetic to the plaintiffs trademark infringement claim: "If any confusion
results, that is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark
that uses a well known descriptive phrase." Id. at 30.
35. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 69, 73-74
(2d Cir. 1999). Comline had used Nihon's mark "Nikkei Weekly" in the reference line of its
abstracts. Id. at 73. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that use was fair because
it would "be impossible to identify the source of the factual information without using a
registered trademark of the source" and defendants had not acted in bad faith. Id. at 73-74.
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The Ninth Circuit's rule prevents confusion and protects
goodwill by recognizing the fair use defense only when there is no
likelihood of confusion.36 For example, a first manufacturer of VCRs
could label its videocassette jacks "VCR 1" and "VCR 2" even
though a second manufacturer had the registered mark "VCR 2" for
its dual cassette VCR.3 7 Consumers would not think the videocassette
jack labeled VCR 2 indicated that the product's source or sponsorship
was from the second manufacturer.38 This high standard39 for
attaining fair use status reflects a policy of protecting a producer's
investment in making its mark recognizable to consumers as an
indicator of source and quality. It also prevents consumers' confusion
about source, and hence, mistakes about the qualities and
characteristics of the products they buy.
Some courts note that where there is no confusion, the alleged
infringer does not need a defense at all.40 The Ninth Circuit's
approach turns the defense into a way to challenge the mark owner's
evidence of likelihood of confusion. Some commentators have
agreed with this interpretation of the role of fair use. Thomas
McCarthy, in his highly regarded trademark law treatise, stated that:
fair use should be viewed as merely one type of use which is not
likely to cause confusion and hence is a 'defense' only in that
sense. Because the paramount goal of the law of trademarks is to
prevent likely confusion, a showing of likely confusion should
trump a 'fair use.'
41
Aside from the inconsistency of calling fair use a "defense" when it is
really just a rebuttal argument, focusing only on confusion eliminates
36. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th
Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment on fair use defense because there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to likelihood of confusion and holding that "[a] fair use may not be a confusing
use").
37. In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 1I F.3d 1460, 1466 (9th
Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 1467.
39. K.P. Permanent, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003),
petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL 22429005 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2003) (No. 03-409) [hereinafter
Petition for Cert.]. In its petition for certiorari, Petitioner commented that the Ninth Circuit's
absence of confusion requirement was an "extra element", id. at * 10, that "is unsupported by the
statutory language of the Lanham Act itself." Id. at * 15.
40. "If a fair-use defense is not to be considered when there is a likelihood of confusion,
then it is never to be considered. The fair-use defense comes into play only when
infringement-including a likelihood of confusion-has been established." Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir.1997).
41. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 11.47.
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the defense in the only situation where it is really needed, when the
mark owner has made out a prima facie case of infringement.
The approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuits fail to
recognize that competing objectives serve important interests to both
consumers and producers. In this article we advocate a more
balanced approach to recognizing the competing interests in a fair use
defense. The balance stems from the treatment of likelihood of
confusion as neither determinative nor irrelevant, but rather, as one of
several factors to be considered and balanced in a fair use analysis.
Most circuits that have considered the role of likelihood of
confusion in a fair use defense under § 33(b)(4) have held that fair use
is possible even when there is likelihood of confusion.42 The Second
Circuit takes this position to the extreme by making likelihood of
confusion, as a factor in itself, irrelevant and thereby
overemphasizing policy supporting competition.43 Other circuits have
not been as drastic and have at least discussed likelihood of confusion
in a fair use defense analysis. 44  Most commonly, courts weave
likelihood of confusion into a fair use analysis by using it to
42. The Second, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that likelihood of confusion
and fair use may coexist. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co.,
125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th
Cir.1997); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1189 n.30 (5th Cir. 1980); and
Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995). The Sixth
and Ninth Circuits have held that they may not. See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies,
L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248
(9th Cir. 1984). The First, Eighth and Federal Circuits have examined likelihood of confusion in
the context of a fair use defense but have not reached this particular issue. Leathersmith of
London, Ltd. v. Alleyn, 695 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1982); Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple
Computer, Inc., 238 F.3d 989; 990 (8th Cir. 2001); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d
1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
43. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d
Cir. 1997), supra note 34. However, other Second Circuit cases recognize that likelihood of
confusion may be relevant in determining other elements in the fair use defense. Venetianaire
Corp. of Am. v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding likelihood of
confusion relevant to determining whether a term is used as a mark); EMI Catalogue P'ship v.
Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding likelihood
of confusion relevant in determining whether the defendant acted in good faith).
44. For example, the Fifth Circuit is "convinced that even if there were a likelihood of
confusion, the defendant would still be entitled to its fair-use defense." Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil
Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1189 n.30 (5th Cir. 1980). But the Fifth Circuit also recognizes that the
absence of confusion is helpful to a fair use defense. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse,
Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 976 (5th Cir. 1983) (considering differences between plaintiffs packaging of
"Fish-Fri" and defendants' packaging of"fish fly" substantial enough so that no confusion was
likely).
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determine whether the elements of the fair use defense45 have been
met.46
Likelihood of confusion thus plays a supporting rather than
independent role in many circuits. Evidence of confusion may, for
instance, be used to indicate that a defendant's use of the plaintiffs
mark was not descriptive47 or was not used "otherwise than as a
mark." 48 Similarly, whether a defendant's use of another's mark was
intended to deceive the public or appropriate the plaintiffs goodwill
in the mark, and thereby cause confusion, is relevant to the good faith
prong of the fair use defense. 49 Even the Second Circuit, which has
held that likelihood of confusion is no bar to the fair use defense,
50
has at times used evidence of likelihood of confusion to determine
whether the fair use factors "otherwise than as a mark" '5 1 and good
faith 52 have been met.
45. Fair use requires that use of another's mark be (1) "otherwise than as a mark," (2)
descriptive and (3) "in good faith". 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4).
46. See infra Part IV (discussing the relevance of likelihood of confusion to good faith).
47. For example, in Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat. Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 423
(4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit found that defendant's use of "Pinehurst" was not descriptive
because it was not limited to informing the public of the geographical location of their golf
course. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision that the plaintiff's "evidence of
confusion showed that [defendants] were not making fair use" of plaintiff's mark.
48. See, e.g., Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d
Cir. 1970) (using likelihood of confusion as evidence that defendants intended to use similar
design as a mark).
49. See, e.g., Leathersmith of London, Ltd. v. Alleyn, 695 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1982)
(finding good faith where "there is no evidence of any intent to deceive customers or to
appropriate plaintiffs good will"); Schafer Co. v. Innco Mgmt. Corp., 995 F.2d 1064, *2
(unpublished table decision) (4th Cir. 1993) (finding the defendant acted in good faith for
purposes of the fair use defense because its billboards that incorporated plaintiffs mark "were
not designed or used to confuse the traveling public"); M. B. H. Enters., Inc. v. WOKY, Inc.,
633 F.2d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that defendant acted in good faith when it used phrases
such as "WOKY loves Milwaukee" and "I love Milwaukee" because it "did not act with the
intent to confuse the public" even though plaintiff's term, "I love you Milwaukee" was similar).
50. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28
(2d Cir. 1997) (discussed in detail supra note 31).
51. In Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir.
1970), the plaintiff sold mattress covers with their mark "Hygient" written on a green oval with
a white cross in the center. The defendant also sold mattress covers with its mark "Hygenic"
written on a red oval with white cross in the center. Id. Although the defendant conceded that its
design was confusing, it asserted the fair use defense. Id. at 1082. The Second Circuit disagreed,
finding that the confusingly similar mattress covers were evidence that the defendant intended to
use their design and word "Hygenic" as a trademark. Id. at 1082.
52. See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228
F.3d 56, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining that good faith in a fair use defense should be
treated the same as in an infringement claim because "the good faith inquiry in a fair use
analysis necessarily concerns the question whether the user of a mark intended to create
consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship").
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Using likelihood of confusion as a relevant but not dispositive
factor in fair use is a better approach to fair use than the Second and
Ninth Circuit approaches for two reasons. First, it gives courts
discretion to strike an appropriate balance among the competing
policy objectives. Second, it recognizes both the supporting and
independent roles of confusion. Analytically, the balancing approach
uses likelihood of confusion to evaluate the explicit elements of the
fair use defense in section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, specifically
whether a term is used as a mark or to describe and whether it was
used in good faith. 3 Avoiding confusion is also an independent
policy objective. Explicit recognition of this independent role
alleviates the concern that likelihood of confusion should not be
considered as an element in the fair use defense because it is not in
the statutory language. 4 By allowing likelihood of confusion to be a
factor in determining fair use, this approach does not treat likelihood
of confusion as an element and thus prevents it from being
dispositive. The balancing approach means that fair use is truly a
defense, and not just a means of rebutting the mark owner's evidence
of likelihood of confusion.
Neither the petitioner nor the respondent in K.P. Permanent
advocates this flexible approach to balancing trademark law's
competing policy objectives. KP urged the Supreme Court to resolve
the conflicts between the circuits in favor of the Second Circuit's
approach,55 while ignoring the cases in which the Second Circuit uses
likelihood of confusion in a supporting role. 6 Lasting Impression
recognized that a number of circuits have used likelihood of
confusion in some fashion in a fair use analysis, but mischaracterizes
those circuits' analyses as being the same as the Ninth Circuit's. 5 7
Thus, respondent urges the Supreme Court to adopt the Ninth
Circuit's rule. Both of these positions would emphasize one set of
trademark policy goals at the expense of the other. Rather than
adopting either of these narrowly focused rules, the Supreme Court
should consider a more balanced approach that weighs both
competing objectives.
53. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 39.
55. In the Petitioner's view, the Second Circuit's approach is "the common sense
interpretation of the statute" because it does not "embellish it w/ an extra requirement."
Petitioner's Brief, No. 03-409, 2003 WL 23015039, at *7 (U.S. Dec. 17, 2003).
56. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
57. Respondent's Brief, No. 03-409, 2003 WL 22977864, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2003). See
supra note 42.
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IV. BALANCING CONFUSION AND FAIR USE
The fact that the variables of interest may each be arrayed on a
continuum facilitates the balancing of competing objectives. The
extent of goodwill embodied in a mark and the extent of harm likely
from another's use may range from slight (for new, highly descriptive
marks) to significant (for famous marks). The likelihood of confusion
and harm to consumers is a continuum of probabilities ranging from
possible to actual. The use of a term may be obviously source-
indicating, such as EXXON for petroleum products, or obviously
descriptive, such as FRESH SQUEEZED for orange juice.
Alternatively, a term's use may send a mixed commercial impression
(a highly stylized combination of a descriptive term combined with
graphic art appearing on packaging). The benefit to others from
descriptive access to a term is a continuum depending, among other
things, on the availability of substitute terms. For example, there are
few substitutes for the term "forest green" describing a color but
many ways of saying "inexpensive". The good faith of a use varies
on a continuum from innocent and heedful of the mark holder's rights
or intentionally exploitative of its goodwill.
When balancing these relevant public policy factors, a more
nuanced resolution of a fair use case is possible. A use is fair if the
benefit to competition and consumers from the descriptive use is
greater than the harm to competition and consumers from confusion.
Balancing is possible and sensible from a policy perspective because
the factors relevant to achieving policy goals fall on continua. In
some cases, the likelihood of confusion is small enough and the
descriptiveness of the term great enough that the use is fair. In others,
the reverse is true.
We propose a standard that allows third parties reasonable access
to an owner's mark for descriptive purposes. On one hand, the
balance considers the inherent distinctiveness of that mark or strength
acquired through secondary meaning or, for a registered mark,
continuous use in commerce for five or more years after registration,
as well as the likelihood of confusion created by the other's use. The
likely harm to consumers and the owner's goodwill is balanced
against the competitive necessity for access to the descriptive use
given available alternative means of description, and of preventing
confusion by using the mark in a context creating a descriptive, rather
than source-indicating, commercial impression. The relevant
evidence on each of these points is of a sort commonly reviewed in
trademark cases.
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There is support for this resolution in the Lanham Act §33(b)(4),
in Supreme Court and Federal Circuit opinions describing the classic
fair use defense, in courts' approaches to nominative, comparative,
and artistic fair use in trademark law as well as fair use in copyright
law.
A. Factors Relevant to Fair Use
Inattention to trademark law's objectives has led to disagreement
about the role of likely confusion in classic fair use cases. Focusing
on those goals reveals that the likelihood of confusion arising from
another's use of an owner's mark is only one factor in the analysis
that can be offset by other considerations. Likelihood of confusion is
an independent factor in the balance because it indicates harm to
consumers. Likelihood of confusion also plays a supporting role in
demonstrating the harm to a mark owner's goodwill, how a mark is
used, and good faith. Other relevant factors to be balanced along with
harm to consumers from confusion are harm to the competitive
process, harm to the mark owner from loss of goodwill, informational
benefits to consumers through descriptive use of terms and related
benefits to the competitive process. No federal courts explicitly
balance the benefits and harms from descriptive use. This section
considers the relevance of confusion and other factors to the fair use
defense.
1. Fair Use, Goodwill, and Competition
When an owner's mark is used for purposes other than
designation of source, its ability to function as a trademark is
diminished, harming both the owner and the competitive process.58
The harm to each depends on the mark's ability to designate source,
which affects its value, and how others use the mark, which affects
the extent of diminution in value. The mark's value as a source-
designator is measured by the goodwill associated with the mark,
which depends on the mark's distinctiveness, whether inherent or
created by the owners' investment. Protecting marks' distinctiveness
supports the competitive process by allowing entrants to promote
their products as different from existing products. Competition
normally drives down prices and leads to greater consumer
satisfaction.59
58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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These considerations are related to one another, yet distinct from
consumer confusion. Goodwill may suffer even without confusion, as
the tort of dilution, codified in Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act 60
illustrates. Similarly, nominative, comparative, and artistic uses of a
mark may dilute the value of a mark without causing confusion as to
source.
61
A mark's distinctiveness is a function of: (1) the term's inherent
distinctiveness as a source-indicator; (2) the mark-holder's successful
investment of resources in establishing consumer recognition of the
mark and the product characteristics the mark signals; and (3)
registration and continuous use as a source-indicator over a long
period of time. Harm to owners' goodwill from another's use
depends on these same indicia of distinctiveness. Until a term
becomes distinctive, it cannot produce for its owner or yield to
consumers the signaling benefits of a trademark. As a mark becomes
more distinctive, the potential for harm to the owner's goodwill
increases.
Evidence of the distinctiveness of a mark, and hence, the amount
of harm to goodwill, may refer to each of these three sources of
distinctiveness. Inherently distinctive terms are those suggestive,
fanciful, or arbitrary terms that, in the context of their use, are likely
to have only a source-indicating function, that is, consumers are
unlikely readily to perceive another purpose for which the seller is
using the term.62 Merely descriptive terms, by contrast, are not
distinctive unless they have acquired secondary meaning indicating
that, "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product
feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the
product itself.' 63  Courts are intimately familiar with methods for
evaluating the inherent distinctiveness of marks.64
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (2000).
61. See infra Part IV.D.
62. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000) ("[A] mark
is inherently distinctive if '[its] intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source. In the
context of word marks, courts have applied the now-classic test originally formulated by Judge
Friendly, in which word marks that are 'arbitrary' ('Camel' cigarettes), 'fanciful' ('Kodak'
film), or 'suggestive' ('Tide' laundry detergent) are held to be inherently distinctive. "'(citations
omitted)).
63. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. Il (1982), most recently
quoted in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
64. More recent Supreme Court cases include Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (considering distinctiveness of product design); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prod. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (considering distinctiveness of use of color as a
trademark); and Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (considering
distinctiveness of trade dress).
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Distinctiveness alone does not ensure goodwill. Regardless of
whether a mark is classified as capable of becoming distinctive (with
secondary meaning) or inherently distinctive, successful investment
can create or enhance goodwill. Much of the same evidence that is
relevant to proof of secondary meaning is relevant here. Such
evidence of acquired goodwill might include: advertising efforts, size,
sales, and any similar evidence that potential buyers had been
exposed to the seller's mark, as well as proof of intentional copying.65
Courts conventionally begin their opinions in infringement cases with
recitations of facts like these in order to describe the parties'
respective roles in the relevant market.
Distinctiveness also comes from long and continuous use.
Incontestability status based on registration and five years of
continuous use ensures, subject to exceptions not relevant here, the
validity of the owner's mark.66 Validity is a separate issue from the
mark's strength or value.67 One function of the incontestability
provision, however, is to encourage producers to cultivate goodwill.68
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to recognize that incontestable
marks have some goodwill, though the actual length and continuity of
use will be more relevant to the extent of goodwill and potential loss.
Optimally, all three sources of evidence of goodwill will be
considered together.
The greater the detrimental effect to owner and competition as
well as to the consumer through confusion from use by others, ceteris
paribus, the greater is the goodwill associated with a mark. 69 Because
65. Heartland Bank v. Heartland Fin., Inc., 335 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting 2
J. THOmAs MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.30 (411
ed. 1999)).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000).
67. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 11:74.
68. Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
69. The Lanham Act, § 43(c)(I)(A)-(H), 15 U.S.C. l 125(c)(I)(A)-(H) (2000), lists
factors relevant to proving whether a mark is famous and distinctive:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
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another's use may diminish the inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
a mark, the value of a mark's goodwill is relevant to the fair use
inquiry independent of whether there is confusion.
2. Fair Use, Likelihood of Confusion, and Harm to
Competition
Source-confusion resulting from another's use of a mark harms
consumers by distorting the signal regarding the source, qualities, and
characteristics of the good.70  This harm is independent of the harm
done to the inherent distinctiveness of the mark and the owner's
investment in it. Courts are intimately familiar with the importance of
consumer confusion in infringement cases and each federal circuit has
adopted its own factors for determining when confusion is likely.71
These courts share certain factors including the similarity of the
marks; the similarity of the products on which the marks are used; the
commercial context including trade channels, advertising media, and
sales techniques; intent; and existence of actual confusion. 2
While the right to a mark and the likelihood of confusion are
dispositive of the mark owner's prima facie case of infringement, they
are not dispositive of a fair use claim. The proposed balancing in the
fair use defense considers three additional factors: (a) the harm to the
mark owner's goodwill, discussed above, (b) the information
transmission benefit to consumers from descriptive uses of terms
reserved by others as marks, and (c) the effect on competition of
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
While the classic fair use test we propose does not require that the mark be famous, the degree
of notoriety of the mark affects the potential for harm to goodwill. Accordingly, these same
factors will be relevant to determine the potential for harm to goodwill. Note that they overlap a
great deal with parts of the likelihood of confusion test.
70. See supra note II and accompanying text.
71. See, In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 817 (1st Cir. 1987); Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc.,
721 F.2d 460, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1983); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d
234, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1997); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998);
Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982);
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 897-98 (7th Cir. 2000); Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v.
Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1999); and Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Inte's Select
Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335 (1.1th Cir. 1999).
72. See supra note 71 and infra note 80.
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permitting sellers to describe their goods and compete more
effectively.
In addition to its independent role as a policy objective, the
likelihood of consumer confusion plays several supporting roles.
Consumers' impressions are relevant not only to how much they are
harmed by confusion, but also to the issues of how much harm a mark
owner's goodwill is likely to suffer and whether an alleged infringer's
use of an owner's mark is only to describe its own goods. Consumers
are more likely to be confused by the alleged infringer's use of the
term as a source-indicator for its goods than its use of the term to
describe those goods. Accordingly, likelihood of confusion plays at
least three roles in fair use analysis: first, the independent role of
measuring the likely harm to consumers; second, as one factor in
measuring the harm suffered by the mark owner; and third, as the next
section demonstrates, as one factor in determining whether a term is
used as a mark, or only to describe the alleged infringer's goods.
3. Fair Use and "Use as a Mark"
In the classic fair use context, the harm to the owner's goodwill
and to consumers confused about source as well as the benefit to
competition from access to descriptive terms depends on whether a
term is used as a mark or used only to describe. Under the Lanham
Act, a trademark is a word, symbol, or device, or combination thereof
used by a person "to identify and distinguish his or her goods...
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown., 7 3  To function as a
mark, those terms must indicate that the goods in connection with
which the term is used came from a particular source. Characterizing
the use of the term depends on the commercial impression created by
the alleged infringer's use.
74
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
74. The Supreme Court's venerable opinion in Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc., v.
Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1920), focused on the commercial impression
created by a descriptive mark in determining registrability. Federal circuit courts have relied on
that test and required that "a designation must create 'a separate and distinct commercial
impression, which ... performs the trademark function of identifying the source of the
merchandise to the customers."' Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile
Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Chem. Dynamics, Inc., 839 F.2d 1569,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Words, symbols, and devices may alternatively function in ways having
nothing to do with the source of either the mark owner or the alleged infringer's product, for
instance, as ornamentation, see, e.g., In re Dassler, 134 U.S.P.Q 265 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (framing
issue as whether three stripe design on Adidas sports shoes were merely ornamentation or
source-indicating); Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, 134 F.3d at 755 (stating that the design of the
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Classifying a term as fitting in the "descriptive" level of the
hierarchy of trademark strength is relevant but not necessary to a
finding that the mark is used "only to describe." Focusing on whether
the term would be classified as "descriptive" in its context rather than
in the abstract,75 courts consider evidence of whether the term
"forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or
characteristics of the goods, 76  recognizing that a term can be
descriptive in two ways: by literally describing a product or by
describing the purpose or utility of a product.77 While these phrases
and this logic are all useful for classifying the strength of an owner's
mark, they are only part of the critical question of whether consumers
view the term, in its context, as descriptive or source-indicating.
First, the classifications of trademark strength for purposes of
establishing distinctiveness and protectibility are not dispositive in the
fair use context. 78 A word mark that is arbitrary, fanciful, or
suggestive in the context of the mark owner's use may be used by
others descriptively. 79 The mark APPLE arbitrarily indicates a source
of computers but descriptively indicates a flavor of candy or brandy.
Second, the Lanham Act § 33(b)(4) demands consideration of
Museum building might serve both ornamental and source-identifying purposes but the Museum
had not used pictures of the design with enough consistency to create a consistent and distinct
commercial impression); as instructions, see, e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v.
Cheesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that printing "Seal
it with a Kiss" did not infringe the plaintiff's trademark "Sealed with a Kiss" because the words
conveyed instruction and were descriptive of an action the defendant wanted its customers to
take); or descriptive, see, e.g., Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270
(2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark pine tree shape was
clearly descriptive of two aspects of its room deodorizers, its pine scent and the Christmas
season during which the defendant sold the item). How a term "functions," depends on the
commercial impression it conveys to consumers and squarely presents a critical issue presented
by the fair use defense: Is the alleged infringer's use "as a mark" or "only to describe?"
75. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir.
1992). See also, Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir.
1976); Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A&P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir. 1970).
76. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at II (quoting General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, Ill
F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940)).
77. 20th Century Wear v. Sanmark-Stardust, 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
78. Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) ("It
is true that the doctrine can apply only to marks consisting of terms or images with descriptive
qualities. That is because only such terms or images are capable of being used by others in their
primary descriptive sense. But it should make no difference whether the plaintiff's mark is to be
classed on the descriptive tier of the trademark ladder (where protection is unavailable except on
a showing of secondary meaning). What matters is whether the defendant is using the protected
work or image descriptively, and not as a mark.").
79. Id.
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consumer's impression of net effect of the alleged infringers' use. It
requires findings both that the use is not to indicate the source of the
alleged infringer's goods and that the use is to describe. The
requirement of "fair use" calls for a judgment of whether any mixed
messages received by consumers are justified by the objectives of the
law.
The alleged infringer's use of the term "as a mark" to indicate
the source of its own goods is the most obvious way in which a mark
owner's goodwill and consumer confusion is threatened. Consumer
confusion and the strength of the mark are relevant to whether a term
is "used as a mark" or "used to describe" because the commercial
impression created by the use both determines whether there will be
confusion and helps classify the use as source-indicating or
descriptive.80 The strength, or distinctiveness, of a mark is relevant to
how a term is used for the same reason it is relevant to confusion. A
consumer viewing an inherently distinctive mark that in no way
describes the goods in connection with which it is used is likely to
assume, because of its arbitrariness, that it is used as a mark. When it
appears on different goods, a consumer already familiar with the mark
is likely to assume that it is again being used as a source indicator.
"The more unusual, arbitrary, and fanciful a trade name, the more
unlikely it is that two independent entities would have chosen it."
81
Consumers viewing terms with acquired distinctiveness as source-
indicators are, by definition, accustomed to viewing the term as a
80. The first element of the Federal Circuit test is "the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression."
Application of E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (emphasis
added). This factor may even, in the proper case be dispositive of the issue of confusion. See,
e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 332-33 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (upholding a
TTAB judgment that "the substantial and undisputed differences in 'appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression' between the marks in this case warranted the grant of
summary judgment that there was 'no likelihood that [the mark's] contemporaneous use by
different parties will result in confusion."').
81. See Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003). The court offers
the following example of the commercial impression created by a fanciful mark:
For example, if consumers become familiar with a toothpaste sold under an
unusual, arbitrary brand name, such as ZzaagQ, and later see that same inherently
distinctive brand name appearing on a different product, they are likely to
assume, notwithstanding the product difference, that the second product comes
from the same producer as the first. .. . In contrast, every seller of foods has an
interest in calling its product "delicious." Consumers who see the word delicious
used on two or more food products are less likely to draw the inference that they
must all come from the same producer.
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mark. But a mark with acquired distinctiveness could also be used
descriptively, thus creating the potential for a mixed message.
8 2
The commercial impression resulting from the alleged
infringer's use of a term also depends on another of the factors
relevant to the likelihood of confusion, methods of marketing. Taking
into account variations in language, all federal circuit tests for
confusion consider factors relevant to determining what commercial
impression the use makes: the conditions under which sales are made,
the classes and sophistication of prospective purchasers, and the
similarity of trade channels and advertising methods.83 Courts are
familiar with evaluating this evidence in the confusion context,
though applying it to a fair use defense is a different task.
Often, marks are "attention getting" devices,8 4 so evidence of
fonts and styles of presentation will be relevant to determining
whether a term is used as a mark. Courts must, however, distinguish
between marks and ornamental devices. 85  Although the attention-
getting feature of a mark is key, the ultimate question is whether, once
the mark is noticed, consumers interpret it as an indicator of source.86
82. See, e.g., Car Freshner Corp., 70 F.3d at 269 (focusing on whether the term was used
"to describe" and stating that descriptiveness depends on the relationship between the mark and
the product described in the context of the alleged infringer's use).
83. A collection of leading federal circuit opinions outlining factors relevant to assessing
the likelihood of confusion appears in note 71, supra.
84. See I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11: 17 at 476 (2d ed.
1984) ("A trademark, or service mark, is an 'attention getting symbol' used basically, and
primarily, to make clear to the customer the origin of the goods or the service."). Where the
allegedly descriptive use does not graphically resemble a mark, courts are more likely to find
that the mark is used fairly. See, e.g., Schafer Co. v. Innco Mgmt. Corp., 797 F. Supp. 477
(E.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd 995 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir.1993), where the District Court held that a
motel's use of the trademarked phrase "SOUTH OF THE BORDER" was fair because it was in
solid white lettering rather than the form or the owner's logo, and Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969), where the Ninth Circuit held that a
repair business's use of the trademarked word "VOLKSWAGEN" was fair because it did not
use the owner's distinctive lettering. Compare World Impressions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
235 F. Supp. 2d 831, 843 (D. I11. 2002), where the District Court found that the map maker's use
of the word "Disneyland" was as a mark because although it was not larger than other place
names on the map, the map maker had used the stylized form of the word "Disneyland" along
with the owner's distinctive castle design.
85. See Boston Prof'1 Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975), where the court reversed the District Court's holding that the use of
sports teams emblems on clothing was merely ornamental and not source-indicating because the
emblems were so associated with the mark owner that consumers would conclude that there was
an association between the owner and the clothing supplier.
86. See, e.g., Dow Brands, L.P. v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 863 F. Supp 963 (D. Minn. 1994)
(considering the relative prominence of the mark "STYLE FREEZE" on the alleged infringer's
packaging) and Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d 274, 276 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(considering the mark LIVING EARTH).
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In WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass 'n,87 the court found that a use
was ornamental despite being attention-grabbing. While the large
size of the trademarked "BOSTON MARATHON" suggested use as a
mark, the timing, meaning, intent, and surrounding circumstances
indicated that the term was only used to describe the defendant's
broadcast. A use may be descriptive but still have characteristics of a
mark just because it is graphically appealing. This issue arises in the
K.P. Permanent case now before the Supreme Court.88 The balancing
test we propose requires that courts look beyond whether a term is
classified as "descriptive" and focus on the commercial impression its
use creates. The real questions are "Is the use descriptive or source-
indicating?" and "If it is a little of both, what is the net effect of
permitting its use?
89
A balancing process implies that there is some tolerable level of
confusion resulting from the "mark-like" character of some
descriptive use or from consumers' inability to perceive the
distinction between use "as a mark" and "to describe." The
descriptive use is justified, despite some confusion, if the benefits to
competition and to consumers through increased information
outweigh the harm to goodwill and to consumers through confusion.
With one exception,9" fair use cases tend to ignore commercial
impression, which focuses on the larger picture, viz., the extent of
trademark use and descriptive use.9' What remains is the question of
how much weight to give the descriptive interest.
87. 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991).
88. Whether "micro colors" is used as a mark is discussed infra Part IV.D.
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 28 cmt. a (recognizes that "in some cases it
may be difficult to distinguish use as an element of a trademark from a nontrademark use").
90. See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prod., 134 F.3d 749, 753
(6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "in order to be protected as a valid trademark, a designation must
create 'a separate and distinct commercial impression, which ... performs the trademark
function of identifying the source of the merchandise to the customers."' (quoting In re
Chemical Dynamics, Inc., 839 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988))). The court also stated that "it
is clear that a plaintiff must show that it has actually used the designation at issue as a
trademark, and that the defendant has also used the same or a similar designation as a
trademark." Id. (citing Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 622-23 (6th
Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing
Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1105 (6th Cir. 1991)).
91. This is particularly surprising given the wide range of trademark contexts in which
commercial impression is key to determining whether the use of a term has the characteristic of
a mark. Commercial impression is relevant to whether trade dress is used as a mark, see, e.g., In
re Pacer Technology, 338 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("In considering whether a design is
inherently distinctive, we consider factors such as ... whether it was capable of creating
commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words."); whether a combination of
descriptive and other unregisterable components of a term together create a distinctive enough
2004]
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4. Fair Use and Benefits from Use of Descriptive Terms
An all-or-nothing rule requiring an absence of confusion fails to
consider competing policy objectives. It always places the harm to
goodwill through diminishment of distinctiveness, to consumers
through confusion, and to the competitive process through diminished
ability to distinguish one's goods above the recognized benefits of
access to descriptive terms. How much weight should the law give to
consumer and competitive benefits derived from descriptive uses?
The policy question before the Supreme Court is how much
weight descriptive fair use should get, if any, when some confusion is
likely. If there is no confusion, the alleged infringer does not need the
fair use defense. In light of the weight the Supreme Court attaches to
access to functional product characteristics, we argue that access to
descriptive terms ought to be allowed even where there is some
confusion. Unlike functional designs, however, to which access is
unrestricted by trademark law, access to descriptive terms ought to be
limited.
impact to qualify as a mark, see, e.g., Courtenay Communications Corp. v. Hall, 334 F.3d 210,
216 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[W]hile an entire mark cannot be disclaimed and also registered,
nevertheless, where the unregisterable components of a mark are combined in a design or
display which is so distinctive as to create a commercial impression separate and apart from the
unregisterable components, it is possible to disclaim those unregisterable components and still
have a mark which is registerable as a whole.") (citations omitted); whether using a only
variation of a registered mark for a long period of time constitutes abandonment of the mark,
see, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[M]inor changes in a mark which do not change the basic, overall commercial impression
created on buyers will not constitute any abandonment." (quoting I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §17:10, at 787 (2d ed. 1984));
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 17:26 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that abandonment can be avoided if
the owner was using a variation on the mark where "the continuing common element of the
mark retains its impact and symbolizes a continuing commercial impression"); whether
amendments to a registered trademark constitute impermissible material alterations, see, e.g., In
re Thrifty, Inc., 274 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding TTAB finding that proposed
amendment would materially alter commercial impression of the mark); whether slogans are
registerable apart from their accompanying marks, see, e.g., Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v. Fed.
Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 608, 619 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[O]ne federal court has explicitly acknowledged
that 'a slogan can only function as a separate trademark if it creates a separate impress from the
house mark."' (quoting Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 346
(D.N.J. 1996))); see also In re Nat'l Training Ctr. Of Lie Detection, 226 U.S.P.Q. 798, 799
(T.T.A.B. 1985) (inquiring whether "the slogan create[s] a commercial impression separate and
apart from the other material on the [product]"); and whether "tacking" of a new component
onto an old mark in order to exploit the priority status of the old mark is permitted, see, e.g.,
Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1158-60 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Id at
1160 (stating that for the purpose of tacking two marks must create the same, continuing
commercial impression and that "it would be clearly contrary to well-establish principles of
trademark law to sanction the tacking of a mark with a narrow commercial impression onto one
with a broader commercial impression").
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Descriptive terms have much in common with functional product
designs.92  The same words and phrases can be arbitrary in one
context ("Black and White" for scotch whiskey) and descriptive in
another ("Black and White" for floor tile).93  The same is true for
product designs; twin springs may be an arbitrary design feature on a
child's toy, but essential to keeping a traffic sign upright in the
wind.94  Neither a term nor a product design is registerable in its
descriptive or functional context,95 while both are registerable, with
secondary meaning,96 in their arbitrary setting. Words, phrases, and
functional designs not in the public domain each have their own
discrete intellectual property protection in trademark and patent law
defining when there should be monopoly rights to exclude, but neither
area of law deems either merely descriptive terms nor unpatentable
functional product designs worthy of protection. Courts use similar
language to describe the special status of descriptive terms97 and
functional matter,9" emphasizing the competitive necessity of keeping
language and unpatentable ideas, respectively, in the public domain.
99
92. A product design is functional "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or
if it affects the cost or quality of the article." Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 850, n.10 (1982).
93. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 154 (9th Cir. 1963)
(describing the strength of the "Black and White" mark for scotch).
94. TrafFix Devices, In. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (considering the
functionality of dual spring design).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(1), (4) (2000).
96. § 1052(f) (2000) (descriptive marks registerable with secondary meaning); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
97. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 100
(2d Cir. 2001) ("[G]ranting one merchant a monopoly over the use of descriptive marks tends
unfairly to prevent competing merchants from employing appropriate descriptive terms in their
marketing."); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 354 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir. 1966) ("[S]ince there
are only so many words that can accurately describe a type of products, the law does not favor
trademark monopolization of such descriptive terms.").
98. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) ("If a product's
functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could
be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever
[because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity].").
99. See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("Furthermore, descriptive terms are in the public domain and should be free for use by
all who can truthfully employ them to describe their goods." (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith,
Inc. v. Comm'r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1920))); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt
Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1992) ("To allow indefinite trademark protection of
product innovations would frustrate the purpose of the limited duration of patents to foster
competition by allowing innovations to enter the public domain after seventeen years."); Keene
Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The purpose of the rule
precluding trademark significance for functional features is to prevent the grant of a perpetual
monopoly to features which cannot be patented.... Products or features which have not
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Public access to merely descriptive marks and functional product
designs promotes competition by increasing the number of
competitors in a market and increasing consumer satisfaction, by
proving information about products in the first case and leading to
advances in technology in the latter. 00
The Supreme Court has directly addressed the weight to be given
to functionality when considering the protectibility of trade dress and
product design. If functional, neither trade dress nor product design
can serve as a trademark, 10' regardless of secondary meaning. °2 An
option giving less weight to functionality would have been to
recognize functional designs as source-indicating marks where they
were not necessary for competition. This would have been consistent
with the pro-competition objective described in the previous
paragraph.
In TraJix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,10 3 the
Supreme Court declined to limit competitors' access to that which
was necessary for competition. The "necessary for competition
argument" arose from language in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co.,t°4 in which the Supreme Court stated that functionality involved
a question of whether denying access to functional matter created "a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" to competitors.
Considering this language, the Supreme Court held in TrafFix that
"[w]here the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there
is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive
necessity for the feature."
' 0 5
If the analogy between functional designs and descriptive terms
were perfect, neither functional designs nor descriptive terms would
be registerable. If a design is functional, it does not matter whether
the manufacturer can establish that confusion as to source will result
qualified for patent protection but which are function are in the public domain, and are fair game
for imitation and copying.").
100. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160-61 (1989)
(discussing the advantages to consumers of keeping unpatentable inventions in the public
domain).
101. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)
(considering impact of functionality of trade dress); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,
529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000) (considering functionality of product design). See also, 15 U.S.C. §
43(a)(3) (2000) (requiring a person bringing a civil action infringement of unregistered trade
design to prove that the matter sought to be protected is not functional).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2(e),(f) (2000).
103. 532 U.S. at 23 (2001).
104. 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
105. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33.
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from others' use. Even if the manufacturer can prove secondary
meaning, it cannot protect functional design in an infringement
action. A parallel approach to descriptive terms would permit
descriptive use of any term without any regard for the potential for
confusion.
The analogy between descriptive terms and functional designs is,
however, not perfect. First, Supreme Court precedent subordinates
trademark law to patent law for the protection of functional designs.
One purpose of the intricate rules of patent law is to determine which
designs should be denied a twenty-year monopoly and remain in the
public domain. 10 6 Granting federal trademark protection and ignoring
those patent rules would give extraordinary perpetual protection to the
first to use the design in commerce. Supreme Court opinions in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 107 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.1°8 forbid states from giving similar unfair competition
protection to ideas in the public domain. The protection of public
access to descriptive terms, by contrast, is not subject to a body of law
outside of trademark to which trademark law must defer. Second,
public access to functional design is not conditioned by a fairness test
as appears in the classic fair use context; functional marks simply do
not qualify as trademarks. 109 A balancing test for classic fair use
recognizes the similar goals underlying public access to functional
designs and descriptive terms as well as the differences created both
by statute (requiring "fair" descriptive use) and policy (lack of
conflict with another area of law).
Given these goals, one sensible approach to considering the
fairness of descriptive use would be to consider evidence related to
the competitive justification for and consumer benefit from the
alleged infringer's descriptive use of the owner's mark. This is
analogous to the requirement rejected by the Supreme Court in the
functionality context, but justified by the differences. An alleged
infringer could offer evidence that without the right to use the term, it
would be at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage. The
interest in use of descriptive terms also assists consumers in selecting
among competing alternatives. Evidence of benefit to consumers
106. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (describing the
purposes of the patent law, the Court stated that "[T]he stringent requirements for patent
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public.").
107. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
108. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
109. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
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from having the particular descriptive term available would be
relevant.
Many other parts of our proposed balancing test have found their
way into the "good faith" inquiry of fair use cases" 0 and discussion of
commercial justification has appeared as part of that element as
well."11 A competitor's use of the descriptive term "leather" to
describe its fragrance was justified because there was "no other
merchandisable descriptive term" available, despite the plaintiffs
registration of the "English Leather Cologne" mark." 2  A
competitor's use of "ruffled" to describe its ridged potato chips in the
face of Frito-Lays registered "Ruffles" mark, however, gave rise to
questions about its good faith because, as other competitors
demonstrated, other terms, such as "ridged," "rippled," and
"dipstyle," were available. 113  An all-or-nothing test requiring an
absence of confusion injures competition and consumers to the extent
it interferes with competitors' or would-be competitors' opportunities
to describe their goods. The greater the commercial justification for
descriptive use, the greater is the tolerable likelihood of confusion,
especially because the mark owner can minimize this risk by selecting
a more arbitrary or fanciful term. 1
4
B. Fair Use and Good Faith
The descriptive term "fair" in "fair use" supports a test that
considers opposing interests and mediates between them. The
statutory requirement that the descriptive term be used "fairly and in
110. See infra Part IV.D.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, at § 28 Reporter's Note cmt. d, concludes that
"Use of an exact copy of a descriptive trademark without commercial justification can indicate
an intent to trade on the good will of the prior user." The Restatement states that "[tihe
existence of adequate alternatives to the trademarked term is often cited as a factor supporting
rejection of a fair use defense and the lack of alternatives is a fact in favor of the defense." Id.
112. Mem Co. v. Yardley of London, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See
also White Swan Lttd. v. Nature Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1290, 1292 (D. Or. 1993) (holding that
using the phrase hummingbird seed mix to describe its mix of flower seeds was fair and in good
faith despite plaintiff's registered mark Hummingbird Garden for the same product because
these were the "only words reasonably available to describe its product").
113. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also
Salton Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F. Supp. 975, 988-89 (D.N.J. 1979) (stating that the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's "Hot Tray" mark was neither fair nor in good faith because
competitors use many other names for such appliances).
114. The Second Circuit's opinions reflect this reasoning by stating that the owner of a
descriptive mark has assumed the risk of confusion by selecting a descriptive mark. See, e.g.,
Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (1997); Car-
Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995).
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good faith"'1 15 calls for a balancing. 16 Courts have not recognized the
balancing among interests described in the previous sections of this
article. In their analysis of "good faith," however, weighing of the
evidence as described above occurs.1 17 When examining the types of
evidence courts discuss under the rubric of "good faith," recognition
of competing interests is apparent.
If there is a component of good faith analysis distinct from the
balancing of competing values discussed above, it is the care the
alleged infringer took to avoid interfering with the owner's mark and
preventing consumer confusion.'1 8 Occasionally, courts consider
115. 15 U.S.C. §33(b)(4) (2000).
116. Although the Lanham Act requires that the term be "used fairly and in good faith",
id., courts and commentators often combine discussion of fairness and good faith in all of the
fair use contexts as if it were a single element. See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill,
Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating, in trademark
infringement context, to prevail on a classic fair use defense, the defendant must prove it used
the term "(1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense, and (3) in good faith); Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating, in false endorsement context,
that the elements of a classic fair use defense are: "1. Defendant's use of the term is not as a
trademark or service mark; 2. Defendant uses the term 'fairly and in good faith'; and 3.
[Defendant] uses the term '[o]nly to describe' its goods or service.") (citations omitted);
Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 639 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating, in First
Amendment fair use context, "To prevail on the fair use defense, defendants must show that: (1)
they used [the plaintiff's mark] in a non-trademark use; (2) the phrase is descriptive of their
goods or services; and (3) they used the phrase 'fairly and in good faith' only to describe their
goods or services.").
117. This combined element, "used fairly" and "good faith," is often simply referred to as
"good faith" when courts present their analysis. See, e.g., Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269-70 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating "In short, fair use permits others to use a
protected mark to describe aspects of their own goods, provided the use is in good faith and not
as a mark," and "It is a fundamental principle marking an outer boundary of the trademark
monopoly that, although trademark rights may be acquired in a word or image with descriptive
qualities, the acquisition of such rights will not prevent others from using the word or image in
good faith in its descriptive sense, and not as a trademark."); Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
267 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating, in First Amendment context, that the relevant
questions of fact are: "the classification of a word or phrase as descriptive, the determination
that a defendant's use was a non-trademark use in good faith, and the finding that consumers are
not likely to be confused about the origin of the defendant's products."). Confusion is relevant
to this issue, as this section demonstrates in greater detail. See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P'ship v.
Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating, in
trademark context, "the good faith inquiry in a fair use analysis necessarily concerns the
question whether the user of a mark intended to create consumer confusion as to source or
sponsorship").
118. "Courts and commentators... equate a lack of good faith with the subsequent user's
intent to trade on the good will of the trademark holder by creating confusion as to source or
sponsorship." EMI Catalogue Partnership, 228 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing summary
judgment finding that questions of material fact existed regarding whether the defendant acted in
good faith. The alleged infringer had used the phrase "Swing, Swing, Swing," descriptive of
what one does with its golf clubs, but the phrase's close connection to the plaintiff's song of the
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whether the alleged infringer conducted a trademark search,
investigated others' uses, sought legal counsel, or took similar
precautions to avoid confusion." 9 The failure to use care may be
relevant only to the alleged infringer's entitlement to the descriptive
use of a mark based on § 33(b)(4)'s explicit requirements and not to
the policy balancing, but such evidence is considered weak evidence
of bad faith. 20 On the other hand, such evidence may be interpreted
as showing that the alleged infringer subjectively believed its use of
the term was only to describe, and was not used as a mark, which
would be relevant to the balancing.
Given the balancing implicit in the good faith inquiry, it is no
surprise that the evidence used to evaluate good faith is relevant to
balancing competing policy objectives. The good faith inquiry is
closely tied to whether the alleged infringer's use is likely to cause
confusion. Good faith is an element in every circuit's test for the
likelihood of confusion.12 ' Evidence of the alleged infringers' extent
of use, subjective intent, and actual confusion are all recognized as
relevant to good faith. 22  Use of the same or similar marks after
failing to reach an agreement on royalties, for instance, is some
evidence of bad faith, though not dispositive.123 All of this evidence
would, of course, be relevant to the primary issue of likelihood of
confusion.
Conclusions about the alleged infringer's good faith are also
drawn from evidence relevant to the distinctiveness of the owner's
mark, evidence related to whether the term was used as a mark or to
describe, and evidence of the competitive utility of the mark as a
descriptive term. For instance, lack of widespread use of another's
mark on promotional or advertising materials has been held to show
good faith, especially when the defendant's trademark is prominently
same title, which the defendant had unsuccessfully negotiated to use in its ad, made the phrase
seem more like an indication of source and likelihood of confusion greater.).
119. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 962-63 (7th
Cir. 1992) (finding weak evidence of bad faith based on these factors given defendant's
reasoned conclusion that confusion was unlikely).
120. Id.
121. See cases cited supra note 71.
122. See, e.g., Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. Orvis Co., Inc., 203 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
123. See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, and Cosmopulos,, Inc.,
228 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing summary judgment finding that questions of material fact
existed regarding whether the defendant acted in good faith.)
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displayed along with the other's mark.1 24 This evidence is relevant to
the issue of commercial impression by which the court decides
whether the term was used as a mark or to describe. If the fair use
test is viewed as a balancing of competing values as suggested above,
there is little apparent role for a separate "good faith" element.
The availability of alternative descriptive terms may make a use
less fair12 5 and presentation of the descriptive term in the same
typeface or appearance as the plaintiff s mark is evidence of bad faith.
Accompanying the alleged infringer's use of the other's mark with the
alleged infringer's own trademarks and corporate logos and
packaging lessens actual confusion.126 This same evidence supports a
conclusion that the term is used descriptively.
The commercial impression of the term in its context is as
important to whether the term is used in good faith as it is to whether
the use is "as a mark" or "to describe." In Sands, Taylor & Wood Co.
v. Quaker Oats Co., the defendant's use of the plaintiffs "THIRST-
AID" mark was suspect because of the rhyming in the phrase
"Gatorade is Thirst Aid" and the greater prominence given in
advertisements to the plaintiffs mark than to the defendant's own
"GATORADE" mark. 127  The court noted that, in the context of
determining likelihood of confusion, the conjunction of defendant's
trademark and the allegedly infringed term so links the term to the
124. See, e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Cheesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125
F.3d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding good faith where the defendant used the plaintiff's phrase
"Sealed with a Kiss" on postcards customers were invited to kiss and mail, but not on its product
or packaging or any other advertising or promotional material).
125. See, e.g., Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. Orvis Co., Inc., 203 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (holding that factual issues precluded summary judgment on fair use defense, where,
prior to the plaintiffs adoption of the term as a mark, competitors used other available terms to
describe the relevant characteristic of their goods). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
1, at § 28 (1995) (stating in comment c that "the absence of alternative terms capable of
adequately describing the pertinent characteristic is also relevant in assessing the commercial
justification for the use and hence the scope of permissible fair use," and in comment d that
"[u]se by the actor of the precise form of the descriptive term adopted by the trademark owner
can be evidence of bad faith when equally useful alternative forms are available.") See also
cases collected in id. Reporters' Note cmt. d.
126. See, e.g., Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir.
1995), which concluded that there was no indication that the defendant was using the plaintiffs
tree-shape as a mark because its pine-tree-shaped air fresheners come in boxes prominently
bearing the 'Glade Plug-Ins' trademark as well as Johnson's corporate logo and each unit had
'Glade' imprinted across the front of the product itself. Given these facts, the court held that
there could be no finding of bad faith even if the defendant knew about the plaintiffs use of the
tree-shape and did not consult counsel. Id.
127. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the District Court did not err in finding that the term "Thirst-Aid" had been used by
the defendant as a mark).
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defendant's name that it "increase[s] the misappropriation" of the
plaintiff s mark. 128 This misappropriation may be taken as evidence
that Gatorade was using the plaintiffs designation as a mark, and
attempting to have consumers associate the words with its product in
bad faith.
Similarly, the Reporter's Note to the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition 129 describes copying the typestyle, packaging, or
labeling of the mark owner as indicative of bad faith, while it is
directly relevant to the issues of confusion and whether the device
was used as a mark. The Reporter compares two cases to illustrate
the different effect of presentation of the device on the finding of
good faith. Close reading indicates, however, that, in both cases, the
evidence was relevant to whether the device was used as a mark.13
0
While courts consider some evidence relevant mostly to whether
the alleged infringer is personally worthy of using another's mark
descriptively, most of the evidence considered to be relevant to "good
faith" is also relevant to the policy-oriented balancing. This suggests
that the role of the good faith inquiry is to accomplish indirectly what
a balancing test accomplishes directly.
C. Intellectual Property Law and Policy
Other fair use defenses in intellectual property law rely on
balancing tests, either implicitly or explicitly. Among trademark
defenses, nominative, comparative, restored goods, and artistic fair
use defenses all consider factors that weigh against the consumer
protection objective. The statutory copyright fair use defense
128. Id. at 954 (citations omitted).
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note I, at § 28 Reporter's Note cmt. d.
130. In Venetianaire Corp. v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970), the
relevant language states "[f]rom the mimicking of plaintiff's typestyle and prominent display of
the registered word 'Hygient' on its own 'Hygienic' package, it is plain that A & P Import did
not use the word 'otherwise than as a trade * * * mark * * * only to describe its goods'; on the
contrary, a 'trademark use' was both effected and intended." But in Andy Warhol Enterprises,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 600 F. Supp. 760, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court states,
First, there is no evidence to suggest that defendant has ever used plaintiff's
stylized INTERVIEW mark. Second, defendant uses "interview" to designate a
section in a magazine, not as a trademark. The statute defines a trademark as a
"word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by
a manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured and sold by others and to indicate the
source of goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (Supp.
1988). Defendant does not use "interview" to identify or distinguish its goods
\ from any others. In both cases, what is characterized as the good faith inquiry by
commentators is part of another issue relevant to the policy balancing.
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considers factors that weigh against the authors' Section 106 rights.
This Part analogizes those tests to the classic fair use test.
1. Nominative Fair Use Analogy
Nominative and comparative uses of marks are types of indirect
descriptive use that are suited for a balancing test. While the classic
fair use case involves use of a term to describe directly the
characteristics and qualities of a good or service ("leather,"'' 31
"hummingbird seed"1 32), nominative and comparative uses occur
when another uses a mark to identify the mark owner's goods or
services, often with the ultimate purpose of describing the goods of
that other person. An auto repair shop might wish to describe its
services using an unrelated manufacturer's mark ("Volkswagen"
repair shop) 133 or a newspaper might wish to use the trademarked
name of a popular musical group in order to convey the fact that a
survey it was conducting concerned that group. 134  A competing
perfume manufacturer might use the "Chanel No. 5" mark to describe
the scent of its own perfume. 135  A restorer or reconditioner of golf
balls 136 or spark plugs 137 may wish to identify the original
manufacturer to describe qualities of its own product. Each such user
"names" a mark owner's product or service to describe its own.
All of these descriptive fair uses are conceptually related by the
conflict between confusion and competition. Nominative and
comparative uses are suited for a balancing test, just as we have
suggested for classic fair use. In its idiosyncratic nominative use
test, 138 the Ninth Circuit requires proof that: (1) the mark owner's
product cannot readily be identified without use of the trademark; (2)
131. Mem Co. v. Yardley of London, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
132. White Swan Ltd. v. Nature Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1290 (D. Or. 1993).
133. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969).
134. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
135. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
136. Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
137. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
138. This test for nominative fair use is cited by some circuits, see, e.g., Pebble Beach Co.
v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 547 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that "the traditional likelihood-of-
confusion analysis is applicable in a comparative-advertising situation, but the court should
usually consider the nominative-use claim in conjunction with its likelihood-of-confusion
analysis to avoid lowering the standard of confusion"), but not regularly followed outside the
Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th
Cir. 2003) (choosing to rely on its customary test for likelihood of confusion); Basic Fun, Inc. v.
X-Concepts, LLC, 157 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (D. Pa. 2001) ("The Third Circuit does not
recognize 'nominative' fair use defense, which is utilized as a defense solely in the Ninth
Circuit.")
2004]
868 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. ..J. [Vol. 20
only so much of the mark is used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the user's product or service; and (3) there is no suggestion
that the user's product or service was sponsored or endorsed by the
mark owner.' 39 The Ninth Circuit views this test as more appropriate
in nominative use cases than its traditional Sleekcraft test 140 for
likelihood of confusion. 141 The third factor captures the confusion
element and would depend on the commercial impression conveyed
by the use. The first two factors, however, suggest that the
competitive necessity of the use is a relevant consideration, as we
argued above. Where courts rely on their traditional likelihood of
confusion tests in cases where the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
mark is to describe the relationship of its own product or service to
the plaintiff's, the competitive necessity of the use is considered along
with reasonable restrictions on the extent of use. 1
42
The restored goods cases are decided by a test derived from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Champion Spark Plug,143 focusing on
whether the differences between the original and remanufactured
goods are greater than consumers expect and whether the
remanufacturer fully disclosed the condition of the used goods.' 44
The underlying question in these cases remains the likelihood of
confusion. 1
45
There is, however, the additional consideration that "so long as
the customer is getting a product with the expected characteristics,
and so long as the goodwill built up by the trademark owner is not
139. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
In Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002), the court stated that
The nominative fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the
plaintiff's mark to describe the plaintiff's product, even if the defendant's
ultimate goal is to describe his own product. Conversely, the classic fair use
analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff's mark only to
describe his own product, and not at all to describe the plaintif's product.
140. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
141. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. Compare Liquid Glass Enters., Inc. v. Dr. Ing, h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398,
402 (D.N.J.1998) (finding it unnecessary for the Liquid Glass product to use Porsche's
trademarks to advertise its benefits) with Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411
F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that it was fair to use the name "Volkswagen" to describe
a Volkswagen repair shop, but not to use the Vw logo).
143. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
144. Id. at 129 ("When the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see
no such sanctity in the [trademark] as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
145. Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(discussing the Champion Spark Plug test in the context of resale of new goods).
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eroded by being identified with inferior quality, the Lanham Act does
not prevent the truthful use of trademarks, even if such use results in
the enrichment of others."'146  This focus on quality of the restored
goods emphasizes not only quality-signaling aspects of the owner's
goodwill in the mark, but also an interest in preventing fraud. The
mark is available for public use as long as consumers' quality
expectations are not defeated. The benefit of descriptive use is
realized as long as it is truthful: "Inferiority is immaterial so long as
the article is clearly and distinctively sold as repaired or reconditioned
rather than as new.' '147 As with the classic fair use test, the use of the
other's mark is limited. The labeling or advertising cannot, for
instance, be formatted in a way that highlights the mark over the other
graphic matter. 148
2. Artistic Fair Use Analogy
Courts also appear to be inconsistent and split on the question of
whether a balancing of competing considerations occurs when
another's mark is used to parody or poke fun at that mark, or the
associated product, or for other artistic purposes. Rather than
balancing the benefits of public access to descriptive terms for
competitive purposes, the countervailing consideration is the public
interest in free expression. The Seventh Circuit has concluded that
parody is not an affirmative defense but rather a factor relevant to the
likelihood of confusion. 149 Some circuits take somewhat inconsistent
positions and recognize a First Amendment interest in certain cases
but not others. 150  The Second, Sixth, and perhaps surprisingly, the
146. Id.
147. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 130.
148. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1924) ("If the name Coty were
allowed to be printed in different letters from the rest of the inscription dictated by the District
Court a casual purchaser might look no further and might be deceived. But when it in no way
stands out from the statements of facts that unquestionably the defendant has a right to
communicate in some form, we see no reason why it should not be used collaterally, not to
indicate the goods, but to say that the trade-marked product is a constituent in the article now
offered as new and changed.").
149. A parody is an artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of a product or mark
for comic effect or for ridicule. Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir.
1993).
150. Compare Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1999) (saying
that parody is not a defense but a factor relevant to confusion); and Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v.
Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that a successful parody calls up an image
of the origin and successfully distinguishes itself from the original thereby preventing
confusion) with Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 665 (5th Cir.
2000) (stating that the likelihood of confusion must be "particularly compelling" when First
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Ninth Circuits explicitly impose a balancing test when likelihood of
confusion confronts parody. 5'
There are two sorts of balancing tests. One, adopted by at least
one case in the Eight Circuit, permits parodic use despite confusion if
there is no alternative avenue of expression.152  This test is
reminiscent of the competitive necessity approach 153 suggested as one
factor of the balancing of descriptive use and likelihood of
confusion. 1
54
The Second Circuit developed a balancing test for artistic fair
use in the context of a title to an artistic work alleged to generate
confusion. It mediates between the "no alternative avenue" test and a
test that permits all "free expression" use of a mark. 155 The court in
Rogers v. Grimaldi rejected the first test because it failed sufficiently
to accommodate the public's interest in free expression. 56  It also
rejected the permissive approach denying any Lanham Act protection
because it did not sufficiently protect the public against flagrant
deception. The Rogers court concluded that the Lanham Act
protection of trademarks "should be construed to apply to artistic
Amendment interest in free expression are involved). The Tenth Circuit has considered parody
as a factor to be considered in the likelihood of confusion analysis without specifically stating
that it was not a defense, see Jordache Enters. Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486
(10th Cir. 1987), but see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,
972 (10th Cir. 1996), where the court concluded that a right to publicity claim required a
balancing, saying "[t]his case instead requires us to directly balance the magnitude of the speech
restriction against governmental interest in protecting the intellectual property right".
151. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (creating a balancing test of
public interest in avoiding customer confusion versus public interest in free expression); Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900-02 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Rogers test
because, in the context of expressive speech, the traditional likelihood of confusion test "fails to
account for the full weight of the public's interest in free expression"). Compare Anheuser-
Busch v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir.1994) (approach to that in Rogers);
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (focusing on the
alternative available means of achieving the artistic objectives).
152. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (creator
of parody tee-shirts not protected by First Amendment because he could have produced parodic
editorials in books, magazines, or film). See also Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods.,
Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998) (denying First Amendment protection to
infringing movie title because there were other titles the producers could have used).
153. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994)
(saying that First Amendment protection was not available to a parodist where the confusing
trademark use was "wholly unnecessary" to the parodist's purposes).
154. See supra Part IV.A.4.
155. In Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495
(2d Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit held that the Rogers test was generally applicable to all
Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression.
156. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
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works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression."' 157 If one were to
substitute "the public interest in descriptive access to the mark," for
"the public interest in free expression," the analogy between the
parodic balancing test and the classic fair use balancing test would be
complete. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits also follow this balancing
approach for artistic use.
158
3. Copyright Fair Use Analogy
The fair use defense in copyright law permits some interference
with the author's rights just as the fair use defenses in trademark law
permit some harm to the goodwill of a mark owner. The copyright
balance reflects an accommodation of conflicting means for reaching
a single policy objective. The constitutional objective of copyright
law is promoting the useful arts.159 This is normally achieved by
awarding an author a monopoly over his or her work that prevents
others from copying it without permission. 160  The useful arts may
also be promoted, however, by criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research involving copyrighted material.' 6 1
But permitting critical analytical or informational uses of another's
work without compensation might interfere with an author's rewards.
Just as confusion is a component of both the mark owner's
infringement case and the classic fair use defense, there is an overlap
between a copyright owner's infringement claim and the copyright
fair use defense. A copyright owner's infringement case requires
proof that the owner has a valid copyright and the alleged infringer
copied protectible elements of the author's work. 62  The second
element requires not merely that a work has been copied, but also that
there be a substantial similarity of copyrightable expression. 63 The
factors relevant to establishing fair use in copyright are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
157. Id.
158. See id; Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2003).
159. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
160. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (explaining
that "[t]he purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort" by protecting the
market value of an original work for a limited time).
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (outlining the factors relevant to fair use).
162. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
163. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980).
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purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.]64
The second and third elements of this defense overlap with the second
element of the owner's copyright infringement case, just as balancing
the confusion objective in the trademark defense overlaps with the
second element of a mark owner's trademark infringement case. The
first and fourth elements provide for the balancing necessary to satisfy
public policy, just as the fair use requirement in trademark allows for
a balancing of objectives in trademark.
Copyright law's objective of encouraging creative activity plays
a role similar to that played by the objective of avoiding consumer
confusion in trademark cases. The second copyright infringement
element may require dissection of the work to determine what copied
expression was protectible.165 There must be a substantial similarity
in the copyrightable expression between the original and copied
works.166 Only original works of authorship qualify for the incentives
provided by copyright law. 167 Facts, ideas, and expressions that are
the only effective way to express an idea are not protected by
copyright law.' 68  "Thin" copyrights, those with only a "slight
quantum of originality"' 169 or with "scant creativity,"'170 get less
protection than those with substantial copyrightable content. On the
other hand, works embodying more particularized expression receive
broader protection. The core of copyrightable expression is highly
original and creative work. The Supreme Court has recognized that
there are relative proportions of fact and fancy in creative works, and
the extent to which expressive language is protected varies from case
164. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The fair use defense is not meant to be a bright line test, but
rather nonexclusive factors considered on a case by case basis that allow courts to apply an
"equitable rule of reason." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,448
n.31 (1984).
165. Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2001).
166. An author's work has been improperly appropriated when there is substantial
similarity between her work and the copied work and too much of the copyrightable elements of
the original work were taken. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
168. See, e.g., Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606
(Ist Cir. 1988) (explaining that copyright is not bar to copying expression when there is
essentially only one way to express an idea).
169. Beaudin v. Ben and Jerry's Homemade, Inc., 95 F.3d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1996).
170. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 147, 163 (E.D.N.Y.
2002).
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to case.17 1 The law provides greater protection for works with more
expressive content, thereby creating greater incentives to produce
such work.
Similarly, the closer works are to the core of copyrightable
expression, the less an otherwise infringing use is considered fair for
the purpose of the defense. 172 Proving the quantum of originality and
creativity for a copyright infringement action is analogous to showing
"the nature of the copyrighted work" in a fair use defense. 173 "Some
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish
when the former works ate copied.' 74  Likewise, the "substantial
similarity" element in the infringement action is reflected in the third
element of fair use defense requiring consideration of the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole."'175 Because the fair use test is a balancing test, however,
there are countervailing considerations that are not part of the
infringement test.
The first (purpose and character of the use) and fourth (the effect
of the use on the potential market) factors of the copyright fair use
test make the policies advanced through copyright law relevant in
determining whether an alleged infringer's use is actually fair. This is
analogous to considering the value of the descriptive use of the term
in a classic trademark fair use balancing. Examining the purpose and
character of the use, as the first copyright fair use factor requires,
raises issues of whether the copied work is used for a commercial or a
171. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (citing Robert A.
Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPR. SOC'Y 560, 561 (1982)).
172. See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) ("This [second factor in
the fair use defense] focuses attention on the extent to which a work falls at the core of creative
expression. Thus, for example, a fictional work might be closer to the core of copyright than a
factual work." (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 495 U.S. 570, 586 (1994))).
173. In an infringement action, a work with a "thin" copyright has less protection because
the work has fewer copyrightable elements. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991) (finding plaintiffs factual compilation of addresses and telephone numbers a
"thin" copyright).
174. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 495 U.S. 570, 586 (1994).
175. In an infringement context, improper appropriation is proved by showing (1)
substantial similarity between the works, Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F.
Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (defining substantial similarity as copying recognizable by a
lay observer), and (2) too much copying of protectable expression, Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding no infringement where defendant's work,
though similar to plaintiff's, did not copy any protectable expression). Likewise in a fair use
defense, the defendant's copying no more than is necessary to achieve his (fair) purpose for the
work weighs in favor of fair use. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
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nonprofit, educational purpose 176 and whether it is transformative, 
177
just as fair use in trademark raises the question of how the owner's
mark was used. Finding that a copyrighted work is used
commercially weighs against fair use because it allows the copier to
profit from another's original work without paying royalties. 78  This
conclusion impedes copyright law's goal of rewarding an author with
an economically beneficial monopoly. On the other hand, finding a
work is transformative weighs in favor of fair use because it furthers
the copyright goal of promoting creation of original works. 179  The
analogy to trademark law is straightforward-use as a mark weighs
against the alleged infringer while use to describe weighs in favor.
The first and fourth factors together highlight the conflict
between the desire to encourage creativity through financial
incentives and the desire to encourage creativity through free access
to expression. If a use has little effect on the market potential or
value of the copyrighted work, as analysis of the fourth factor might
reveal, preventing the use is unnecessary because the use does not
impede the copyright goal of providing incentives to create.' 80  In
fact, restricting a use that has no effect on the copyrighted work's
market potential would have a contravening impact on copyright
policy because it would "inhibit access to ideas."' 8' Similarly, if a
descriptive use of a trademark causes little confusion about source,
preventing the use is less necessary because, while it may harm
goodwill, it also informs consumers and encourages competition.
Avoiding a bright line test in copyright law, the balancing
approach to fair use allows a more fluid determination of whether a
176. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
177. A work is transformative when it "adds something new, with a further purpose of
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message." Campbell, 510
U.S. at 579 (1994).
178. See id. at 583-85.
179. Transformative works "lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use." Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
180. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984);
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. In Sony Corporation of America, copyright owners of television
programs sued manufacturers of home videotaping machines for copyright infringement.
Although users of the defendants' machines normally copied entire copyrighted television
programs without change (factors 2 and 3), the court found that the use was fair because it did
not impede any copyright policies (factors I and 4), Sony Corp. of Am., at 464 U.S. at 454-55.
Thus, in that case the policy considerations trumped the considerations that seemed to indicate
infringement.
181. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 450-51.
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defendant's use hinders the goals of copyright law in a fact-specific
situation.' 82 The balancing approach to classic trademark fair use is
similar to copyright fair use. It allows an analysis that balances
factors relevant to the policy objectives by allowing likelihood of
confusion to be relevant, though not determinative. Rather than a
bright line test requiring a complete absence of confusion, fair use
should be a more flexible analysis that considers whether the use
impedes the policy objectives of trademark law.
D. Fair Use in K.P. Permanent
The balancing test described in this Part can readily be applied to
the issues presented by KP. Permanent. KP's motion for summary
judgment raised issues dispositive of both its action for declaratory
relief and its classic fair use defense.' 83 Only the later set of issues is
relevant to the question before the Supreme Court. Lasting
Impression's motion for summary adjudication does not involve any
issues directly related to the relationship between confusion and
descriptive use. 184 The available evidence suggests that there was
neither appreciable harm nor great benefit associated with permitting
KP's use. Nevertheless, evidence on questions related to likelihood
of confusion from KP's use, potential harm to Lasting Impression's
goodwill, whether the term was used as a mark or to describe, and the
benefits of descriptive access was not considered because of the Ninth
Circuit's requirement that there be no likelihood of confusion.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should remand the case to the Ninth
Circuit to reconsider the evidence in light of the balancing test. If the
evidence was not sufficiently developed for the Ninth Circuit to make
a decision, it should remand the question to the District Court, but for
entirely different reasons than articulated in its opinion.
1. The Mark Owner's Goodwill
Evidence of a mark owner's goodwill and the potential for harm
comes from evidence of inherent distinctiveness, successful
investment of resources, and continuous exposure to consumers over
time. It is the marketing value of the trademark as a signal of source,
qualities, and characteristics of products-consumer recognition of
182. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (noting that "[a]ll [fair use factors] are to be explored, and
the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright").




876 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 20
the mark, association of the mark with a single source, and acceptance
of that mark-that gets trademark protection.
There was little support for concluding that Lasting Impression's
mark, or at least the words "micro color" in the graphic, carried a
great deal of goodwill. There was no genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the words were generic,18 5 but the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that the mark was protectible was based only on the
incontestability of the mark, not on an analysis of other bases for
establishing its strength. 186 The Ninth Circuit rejected KP's summary
judgment argument that the mark was descriptive and without
secondary meaning, holding that "Lasting's incontestable registration
is conclusive evidence that the mark is non-descriptive or has
acquired secondary meaning, ' 87 citing the Supreme Court's opinion
in Park 'N Fly.18  Park 'N Fly stands for the proposition that a
registrant with an incontestable mark has the right to use the mark. 1
89
An alleged infringer cannot challenge the strength or distinctiveness
of the mark based on descriptiveness or lack of secondary meaning
because the mark is conclusively presumed valid.' 90  But
incontestability status supplies no information or presumption about
the strength of a mark, so that status alone does not establish that the
mark actually carries goodwill.
Long and continuous use combined with other indicia of a
mark's selling power may offer evidence of the goodwill associated
with that mark.19' The mark in this case has been registered since
1993,192 which gives others constructive knowledge of Lasting
Impression's claim to ownership of the mark, 193 but does not provide
evidence of the goodwill associated with the mark. In its unreported
decision, the District Court had held that the mark was generic or
185. Id. at 1070.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
189. Id. at 196 ("Thus, § 33(a) would have allowed respondent to challenge petitioner's
mark as merely descriptive if the mark had not become incontestable. With respect to
incontestable marks, however, § 33(b) provides that registration is conclusive evidence of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the mark, subject to the conditions of § 15 and the seven
defenses enumerated in § 33(b) itself. Mere descriptiveness is not recognized by either § 15 or §
33(b) as a basis for challenging an incontestable mark.").
190. Id.
191. See Part IV.C, supra.
192. K.P. Permanent 1, 328 F.3d at 1065.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2000) ("Registration of a mark on the principal register.., shall be
constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership thereof.").
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descriptive without proof of secondary meaning. 194  While this
evidence is not relevant to the right of Lasting Impression to use its
incontestable mark, if upheld it does show that the mark is not
inherently distinctive. The Ninth Circuit's holding that the mark was
not generic as a matter of law, 195 while refusing to consider the
descriptiveness claim meant that there was no discussion of any other
evidence related to distinctiveness. Nor was there any discussion of
acquired distinctiveness though investment or notoriety. On the basis
of the evidence discussed by the Ninth Circuit, there is no reason to
conclude that great harm to goodwill is likely to result from another's
descriptive use, 19 6 but that evidence is largely undeveloped.
2. Use as a Mark
The Ninth Circuit asserted without analysis that KP's use of the
term "micro color" was descriptive of its own products.' 97 The court
did not consider the commercial impression created by the use or any
argument that the term was used as a mark, alluding only to the
likelihood of confusion.' 98  Commercial impression may start with a
classification of the strength of the mark (which the Ninth Circuit did
not consider beyond its generic nature), but must go ultimately to how
consumers interpret the term in context.
194. K.P. Permanent 1, 328 F.3d at 1066.
195. Id. at 1070.
196. Arguments in the parties' briefs presented to the Ninth Circuit present a question of
fact regarding whether Lasting Impression's mark carried any goodwill. Lasting Impression
argued its mark had secondary meaning, offering evidence (a) of testimony by its distributor on
consumers' association of the mark with Lasting Impression, (b) that the only one competitor
other than KP using the "MICRO COLORS" mark had ceased doing so on its request, (c) of
advertising by itself and its affiliate, and (d) a trade magazine reference to "micro colors" as
Lasting's brand name. Appellant's Brief at 19, K.P. Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I., Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-56055), available at 2002 WL
32103603 [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. KP argued that (a) the testimonial evidence should be
given little weight because it is biased, (b) the competitive use was not as a mark but descriptive
and other competitors have used related descriptive terms, (c) the fact of advertising is not
persuasive as it is effectiveness, and (d) the reliability, independent, and reputation of the
magazine were questionable. Appellee's Brief, supra note 22, at 11. At best, Lasting
Impression's evidence is weak evidence of harm to goodwill, falling far short of proof that the
mark is, for instance famous. See supra note 69.
197. K.P. Permanent 1, 328 F.3d at 1072. This finding obviated the need to consider
whether the use was nominative, and thus descriptive of the owner's product, rather than merely
descriptive. ld at 1071-72.
198. Id. at 1072-73 (holding that there were genuine issues of material fact related to
likelihood of confusion).
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Lasting Impression objected to the highly stylized use of the
term in the heading for the color chart.1 99 The changing type faces,
the image of the dripping vial, and the prominence of the term are all,
it claimed, evidence that the term was being used to get attention,
rather than simply to describe.200 The use of these devices does give
the chart heading the appearance of a logo.
KP argues that, in the context of a ten page brochure, "micro
color" in combination with the words "pigment chart" only accurately
describe the chart.20 1 The typefaces and graphics might be interpreted
as an ornamental use20 2 rather than use as a mark. There was no
evidence of other marketing uses or attachment of the mark to the
product,2°3 except for KP's plain typeface use on the bottles to
indicate color, e.g., "MICROCOLOR: BLACK," that preceded
Lasting Impression's first use 20 4 and to which Lasting Impression did
not object. Commercial impression based on these provides only a
weak basis for concluding that KP used the term as a mark, but the
Ninth Circuit did not consider these arguments.
3. Value of Descriptive Access
Just as there is only weak evidence supporting a loss of goodwill
and that the term was used as a mark, there is also only weak
evidence of any competitive necessity to use the term descriptively.
The best evidence in favor of permitting KP descriptive access to the
term "micro color" as a heading for its pigment color chart is that it
has historically (and prior to Lasting Impression's first use) used
"micro color" on its bottles to describe the contents. It would be
helpful to use the same term on the bottles and the chart. Yet, Lasting
Impression might not have objected to a plain typeface heading on the
chart.205 In addition, the Ninth Circuit in its discussion of the generic
199. Appellant's Brief, supra note 196, at 32.
200. Id.
201. Appellee's Brief, supra note 22, at 49-50.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
203. The typical appearance of a mark on goods is as an attachment to goods. See 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining "use in commerce" on goods as occurring when the mark "is
placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on
the tags or labels affixed thereto.")
204. K.P. Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1065
(9th Cir. 2003).
205. Appellant's Brief, supra note 196, at 16 ("The use of microcolor in the brochures
cannot be said a good faith fair use because it serves no descriptive purpose and, to the contrary,
is in the form of a logo that the consuming public could readily understand was a source-
identifying designation in trademark form.").
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nature of the term "micro color,, 20 6 and both parties in their appellate
briefs20 7 emphasized the availability of other, more obvious terms for
describing the colors, such as "micro pigmentation colors" or "micro
pigments." KP's case for necessity rests on its history of use and the
convenience of abbreviation. While weak evidence of likely harm
suggests that the use should be allowed, the weak evidence of
competitive necessity makes public access to the term less
compelling. Because it gives dispositive weight to the likelihood of
confusion, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the value of descriptive
access.
4. Likelihood of Confusion
The Ninth Circuit assumed that confusion could result from a
descriptive use.208 The District Court did not reach the question of
likelihood of confusion because Lasting Impression's mark was not
protectible because it was either generic or descriptive without
secondary meaning and KP's use was descriptive. The Ninth Circuit
identified its Sleekcraft factors as the appropriate test, but, without
analysis, concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact
with respect to likelihood of confusion.0 9 Part IV of this article
described the relevance of this determination to the various elements
of the balancing test.
The balancing test calls for consideration of the harm from
consumer confusion. While Lasting Impression argued that all factors
favored a finding of confusion, 210 KP argued that there was no actual
confusion, the appearance of the term in its use was dramatically
dissimilar from Lasting Impression's composite mark, that the
professionals who bought the pigments were sophisticated consumers,
and that Lasting Impression's mark was weak.21 If some confusion is
acceptable given the value of descriptive access, as the balancing test
suggests, there may, in fact, be material question of fact with respect
to both the confusion and the balancing for the District Court to
decide.
206. K.P. Permanent 1, 328 F.3d at 1069-70.
207. Appellant's Brief, supra note 196, at 14-15; Appellee's Brief, supra note 22, at 12-
13.
208. K.P. Permanent I, 328 F.3d at 1072.
209. Id.
210. Appellant's Brief, supra note 196, at 9-10,21.
211. Appellee's Brief, supra note 22, at 30-32.
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5. Fairness and Good Faith
Having concluded that the absence of confusion was essential to
a classic fair use defense, the Ninth Circuit did not consider whether
the descriptive use was fair or in good faith. The Ninth Circuit did
not engage in balancing. Further, the court did not consider the extent
to which Lasting Impression's goodwill was harmed, the benefits to
consumers from KP's use, or the competitive necessity for KP's use.
The balancing test considers the net effect of what might be a weak
case for established goodwill, an undetermined amount of consumer
confusion, and a weak case for benefits from public access. Because
evidence was not well developed on many of these issues in the
District Court, the Ninth Circuit would be justified in reversing the
District Court's grant of summary judgment for KP and remanding
for further proceedings. This result comes for vastly different reasons
than those presented by the Ninth Circuit. Thus, the Supreme Court
should remand the case to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to rule
on KP's summary judgment motion taking the balancing of
competing objectives into account.
V. INCONTESTABILITY
The balancing test may appear to interfere with the policies
underlying the incontestability provisions in Section 15 of the
Lanham Act.2 12 Any true defense, one that is available even if a
plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of infringement, gives less
protection to incontestable marks than the Ninth Circuit's approach,
which is not really a defense at all.213 The balancing test is, however,
consistent with and promotes those policies.
Allowing a mark to become incontestable serves three main
purposes: (1) to quiet title to a mark after a long period of continuous
use214 by giving the incontestable mark owner the benefit of a
conclusive presumption "of the validity of the registered mark and of
the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark,
and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce ... in connection with the goods or services specified;"2 5
212. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2004).
213. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
214. Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000).
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(2) to encourage registration; 216 and (3) to motivate producers to
invest in the goodwill associated with their marks.2 17 In this section,
we examine whether the balancing test for fair use furthers or inhibits
the purposes of incontestability.
The balancing test does not affect the first purpose, and is
therefore compatible with it. Incontestable status, available to
registered marks that have been in continuous use for five years,
remains conclusive evidence of ownership and exclusive rights in a
mark as well as the mark's validity, subject to statutorily enumerated
means of showing defects.2 18  Since it is conclusive evidence of
ownership and exclusive rights, incontestable status quiets title in the
mark,2 19 relieves the mark's owner of the burden of fighting
challenges to its validity, and limits the adversary's means of
challenge.22 °
The Supreme Court confirmed that a defendant in an
infringement action could not challenge the validity of an
incontestable mark in Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly.221 It is
important to distinguish between the validity of a mark and the scope
of protection a valid mark deserves. A majority of courts have held
that the Park 'N Fly holding does not prevent an alleged infringer
from challenging the scope of protection of an incontestable mark.22 2
Thus, a mark's validity does not determine its strength or, because it
depends on strength, the mark's scope of protection. The balancing
test gives deference to the validity of the mark as ordered by Park 'N
Fly, but it allows the strength of the mark to be considered as a factor
in establishing the fairness of a descriptive use.
The balancing test strongly supports the second and third
purposes of incontestability: to encourage registration and investment
in goodwill. Investing in a mark's goodwill increases the strength of
that mark because it becomes more recognizable to consumers as an
indicator of quality and source. Stronger marks therefore have a
broader scope of protection because of their higher value. In the
balancing test, broader protection accompanies the greater likelihood
216. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198, citing Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1944) (testimony of Daphne Robert,
Member of the Trademark Litigation Committee, ABA).
217. See Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198.
218. Lanham Act §§ 15 and 33(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065 and 1115(b) (2000).
219. Park NFly, 469 U.S. at 198.
220. Id. at 196 (interpreting 15 U.S.C § 1115 (b)).
221. Id. at205.
222. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 32:155.
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of confusion and greater goodwill resulting from greater consumer
association of the strong mark with a particular source and quality.
Where the mark is strong, it is more likely the fair use balance will
favor the mark owner.
If likelihood of confusion were not a factor in balancing fair use
of another's mark, mark owners would have less incentive to invest in
goodwill. Without the consumer protection and goodwill and
competition objectives in the balance, others would be able to use an
incontestable mark based only on its descriptive desirability,
frustrating trademark policy, so long as the other requirements of
§ 33(b)(4) were satisfied. The balancing test is, therefore, completely
compatible with the goals of incontestability status and other policy
objectives.
The balancing approach to fair use provides less protection to
incontestable marks than a rule that ignores the strength of the
owner's mark, but remains in step with Congress' balance of rights
and court's view of incontestability. The benefits of incontestability
were not meant to be boundless. Incontestable marks owners are not
relieved from the burden of proving the elements of an infringement
claim. 223  Even though Congress determined that "a sound public
policy requires that trademarks should receive nationally the greatest
protection that can be given them,, 224 it has enumerated nine defenses
and defects to benefit alleged infringers.225  Some of these nine are
means to challenge the validity of the mark and owner's right to use
the mark.226  But even if the mark is valid, alleged infringers may
227 righprevail by demonstrating fair use, prior right,22 that the mark is
being used to violate the antitrust laws,229 or other equitable
defenses.230 The Supreme Court's decision in Park 'N Fly does not
prevent consideration of the strength of an incontestable mark from
being used in a likelihood of confusion analysis. In fact, the Court
specifically recognized that likelihood of confusion could be analyzed
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1 15(b) (2000). However, the plaintiff's exclusive right to use the mark
is conclusively established by incontestability. Id.
224. Park 'NFIy, 469 U.S. at 193 (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, at 6 (1946)).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(l)-(9) (2000).
226. Marks may be challenged if the registration was obtained fraudulently, § 11 15(b)(l),
or the mark has been abandoned, § 1115(b)(2) , or misrepresents the source, § 1115 (b)(3), or is
functional, § 11 15(b)(8).
227. § 1I15(b)(4).
228. § 1115(b)(5) and (6).
229. § 1115(b)(7).
230. § 1115(b)(9) (including the equitable defenses of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence).
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on remand,23 ' and, on remand, the Ninth Circuit found there was a
likelihood of confusion.232 The majority of Courts of Appeal have
held that the strength of an incontestable mark may still be debated in
an infringement analysis.233
If the balancing test did not consider the value to competition
and to consumer choice of descriptive use of terms, a mark owner's
rights would trump consumers' conflicting interests, thereby
thwarting the broader objectives of trademark law.234 KP's Petition
for Certiorari indicates its concern for establishing a doctrine of fair
use that increases certainty in trademark law.235 Although an approach
that balances factors is inherently less certain than a bright line rule, it
does not leave mark owners and others wholly unaware of whether a
fair use defense would be successful. The criteria for evaluating fair
use and the evidence parties would present are familiar from other
areas of trademark law. Moreover, mark owners know exactly what
to do to increase their chances of preventing a fair use defense: select
marks less likely to be used descriptively, to and invest in their
goodwill. That is precisely what trademark law generally encourages.
CONCLUSION
Trademark law seeks to strike an appropriate balance between
the overlapping and competing interests of consumers, mark owners,
and the market. From a consumer perspective, it favors tight
protection of marks so that consumers can rely on marks as indicators
of source and quality. On the other hand, allowing competitors to
make limited use of another's mark benefits consumers by increasing
information about alternative goods or services and increasing
competition which decreases costs for these items. Similarly, mark-
owners benefit from exclusive use of their marks because they invest
in their marks' goodwill to establish consumer recognition and
loyalty. However, nonexclusive mark protection lowers entry barriers
for new competitors by, for example, allowing them to use another's
mark descriptively to convey information to consumers about its own
product or service. Such uses also serve the market's interest in
promoting competition. Despite the market-based advantages to these
uses, such utilization must be limited so that consumers are not
231. Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985).
232. Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 782 F.2d 1508, 1509 (4th. Cir. 1986).
233. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 11:74.
234. See supra Part I.
235. Petition for Cert., supra note 39, at * 12.
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confused about the source of the goods or services so that vigorous
competition is not impeded.
Trademark law's fair use defense mediates between these
interests by allowing another to use a mark owner's term in a
descriptive, non-source-indicating manner. Despite the connection
between these competing interests and the purpose of the fair use
defense, courts have routinely applied the fair use defense
mechanically, without examining the policy it represents. We
propose adopting a balancing test for classic fair use of trademarks
that allows a use only when the benefits of the descriptive use to
consumers and competition outweigh the harm to consumers from
confusion and to mark owners from damaged goodwill.
Our approach recommends that courts consider a mark's
distinctiveness and whether it is used as a source-indicator in light of
the commercial impression of the use. Likelihood of confusion plays
a supporting role in these determinations: consumer confusion about
the source or sponsorship of goods bearing another's mark may
indicate that the use was not to describe. Our approach also considers
independently the strength of and injury to a mark owner's goodwill
and the likelihood of confusion in the marketplace and its potential
injury to competition. Ultimately, whether the mark is used fairly and
in good faith, and is therefore entitled to the fair use defense, depends
on balancing these factors and determining if the benefits of the use
outweigh its harms.
This approach is better than either of the approaches advocated
by KP or Lasting Impression for several reasons. First, by treating
likelihood of confusion as a relevant, but not dispositive factor, our
approach allows competing policy interests to be considered in
fashioning an equitable result in a fair use case. Weaving likelihood
of confusion into a fair use analysis will not be difficult or
burdensome for courts because they are already accustomed to
evaluating factors related to likelihood of confusion in the
infringement context. Adopting a balancing test for classic fair use of
trademarks also brings that doctrine into line with other types of fair
use in intellectual property law. The nominative, comparative, and
artistic fair use trademark defenses as well as the test for fair use in
copyright each employ a balancing test to determine whether the use
of the mark or the copyrighted work, respectively, was fair.
Trademark law is designed to protect and advance the interests
of consumers, producers, and the market. While some of these
interests overlap, others are at odds with each other. To determine
whether use of another's mark is truly fair, the interests of all parties
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should be considered and balanced. When the benefits of the use
outweigh its harms, the use should be considered fair.

